Workplace Smoking in New Jersey:
Time for a Change
Lung cancer is the most common cause of cancer death in
New Jersey.' Lung cancer is an avoidable cause of cancer because
it is primarily associated with voluntary cigarette smoking. 2 A more
recent risk factor for lung cancer, however, is involuntary exposure
to secondhand cigarette smoke.3 Specifically, both the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 4 and the United States Surgeon
General5 concluded that environmental tobacco smoke (ETS) is a
human lung carcinogen, causing an estimated 3,000 nonsmoker
lung cancer deaths per year in the United States. 6 Equally alarm1 FRANCESJ. DUNSTON, M.D., M.P.H., NEWJERSEY DEP'T OF HEALTH, HEALTHY NEW
2000-A PUBLIC HEALTH AGENDA FOR THE 1990's 30 (1991). The New Jersey
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Department of Health declared that individuals possess a one in three lifetime chance
of contracting cancer. Id. at 31. The department stated that this statistic can be altered, however, through individual modification of risk factors. See id. at 30.
2 Id. at 31. Among the ways to reduce the cancer risk, the Department of Health
explained, are to: (1) increase individual resistance by eating high fiber diets; and (2)
remove the causes of cancer such as cigarette smoke. Id. at 32. Cancer screening, Dr.
Dunston added, is also beneficial because it can detect the disease before the symptoms appear. Id. Additionally, the doctor stated that treatment is most effective
before symptoms occur. Id.

3 U.S. ENvrL. PROTECTION AGENCY, EPA/600/6-90/006F, RESPIRATORY HEALTH EFLUNG CANCER AND OTHER DISORDERS 1-2 (Dec. 1992)

FECTS OF PAssIvE SMOKING:
[hereinafter EPA REPORT].

4 Created in 1970, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has the following
functions:
-The establishment and enforcement of environmental protection
standards consistent with national environmental goals.
-The conduct of research on the adverse effects of pollution and on
methods and equipment for controlling it, the gathering of information
on pollution, and the use of this information in strengthening environmental protection programs and recommending policy changes.
-Assisting others, through grants, technical assistance and other means
in arresting pollution of the environment.
-Assisting the Council on Environmental Quality in developing and
recommending to the President new policies for the protection of the
environment.

42 U.S.C. app. § 4321 (1989).
5 The Surgeon General is appointed for a four-year term by the President with
confirmation of the Senate. 42 U.S.C. § 205 (1989).
6 EPA REPORT, supra note 3, at 1-1. Environmental tobacco smoke (ETS), also
known as the sidestream smoke emitted during tobacco combustion, is classified as a
Group A human lung carcinogen under the EPA's carcinogen assessment guidelines.
Id. at 1-6, 1-8. The EPA based its conclusion upon many reasons, including the causal
link between lung cancer and smoking. See id. at 1-8 to -10. Animal bioassays and
genotoxicity experiments, the EPA explained, also provided supporting evidence
through lifetime inhalation studies in rodents. Id. at 1-9. In addition, the EPA recog-
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ing is the fact that ETS is in the same cancer category as asbestosboth kill innocent people.7
In 1986 the United States Surgeon General expanded the
1964 report that recognized smoking as a leading cause of cancer
deaths and concluded that ETS exposure is a health risk for both
smokers and nonsmokers alike.8 Further bolstering the 1986 report, recent epidemiological and medical studies doubled the evidence of the negative effects of secondhand smoke. 9 Of major
nized that different research teams from eight countries gathered broad-based evidence demonstrating a link between lung cancer and spousal ETS exposure, and that
large case-control studies showed "a strong exposure-related statistical association between passive smoking and lung cancer." Id. High exposure groups, the EPA asserted, provide the best opportunity to detect distinct associations between ETS and
lung cancer. Id. at 1-10. After adjustments for possible upward bias for nonsmokers,
the EPA elucidated that the effects of ETS remain statistically significant. Id. The
EPA added that there is a lack of proof to attribute confounding factors (i.e., history
of lung disease, diet, etc.) to the association between ETS exposure and lung cancer.
Id.
7 The EPA's New Report.. .Secondhand smoke, XIII HOPE HEALTH LETTER (The Hope
Heart Inst., Seattle, Wash.),July 1993, at 6 [hereinafter The Hope Heart Inst.] (quotation omitted). Asbestos and ETS are Group A carcinogens, defined as mixtures or
compounds capable of causing cancer in humans. U.S. ENvTl. PROTECTION AGENCY,
RESPIRATORY HEALTH EFFEcrs OF PAssIVE SMOKING, FACT SHEET 2 (Jan. 1993).
The New Jersey statutes providing for worker protection from asbestos exposure
would be a good model for statutes that protect employees from ETS. See N.J. STAT.
ANN. §§ 34:5A-32 to -42 (West 1988). The New Jersey statute protecting workers from
asbestos exposure reads:
The Legislature finds that the application, enclosure, removal and encapsulation of asbestos when improperly performed creates unnecessary
health and safety hazards which are detrimental to the State's interest,
and that of its citizens, in terms of wage loss, insurance, medical expenses, disability compensation payments, family life, preservation of
human resources and unfair competition to craftspersons, their unions
and their employers.
NJ. STAT. ANN. § 34:5A-32 (West 1988).
8 BuREAu OF Bus. PRAc., ENVIRONMENTAL TOBACCO SMOKE IN THE WORKPLACE:
HEALTH, LEGAL, AND ECONOMIC IMPACTS 9 (1993); see EPA REPORT, supra note 3, at 1-2.
In 1989, the Surgeon General reported that smoking caused one of every six cancer
deaths in the United States and estimated that in 1985 smoking accounted for approximately 80% of female lung cancer deaths and 90% of male lung cancer deaths.
Id. at 1-6.
9 EPA REPORT, supra note 3, at 1-2. Such studies, the EPA explained, confirm that
ETS exposure is associated with reductions in lung functions as well as increased respiratory symptoms. Id. at 1-15. Medical studies show that children exposed to ETS
suffer from an increased risk of lower respiratory tract infections and asthma. Id. at 11. The EPA asserted that children exposed to ETS are more likely to develop asthma
and, in addition, may suffer from the following: increased respiratory symptoms such
as coughing and wheezing; increased middle ear effusion (a symptom of middle ear
disease); reduction in lung function; increased risk of pneumonia, bronchitis, and
bronchiolitis; and, increased severity of asthma attacks in children who have asthma.
Id. at 1-5.
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concern to employers and employees is the means of controlling
ETS exposure in the workplace.10 The impetus of this debate is the
conflict between smokers, who assert the right to smoke, and nonsmokers, who assert the right to breathe air free of secondhand
smoke."
This Comment analyzes the effects of smoking in the workplace and examines workplace smoking regulations in New Jersey.
Part I of this Comment focuses on the reasons for workplace smok10 See NATIONAL INST. FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETyw & HEALTH, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH
& HUMAN SERVS., CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 54, ENVIRONMENTAL TOBACCO
SMOKE IN THE WORKPLACE iii (June 1991) [hereinafter NIOSH BULLETIN] (discussing
the health effects of tobacco smoke and potential for occupational exposure). The
Bureau of Business Practice included the following U.S. Surgeon General quote in its
report:
[U]rban adults spend more time at work than at any other location except home. For adults living in a household where no one smokes, the
workplace is the greatest source of ETS exposure. Consequently, an individual's workplace ETS exposure can be substantial in duration and
intensity[.] . .. Furthermore, individuals have less choice about their
ETS exposure at work than they do in other places, such as restaurants
or auditoriums.
BUREAU OF BUS. PRAC., supra note 8, at 4. The Surgeon General also declared that a
quality indoor air environment should be the norm protecting individuals from ETS
exposure. Id. The Surgeon General recommended that all adults should share in the
responsibility of protecting individuals from ETS, specifically in the adult roles of employer, employee, parent, smoker, and non-smoker. Id.
11 See Smoking in the Workplace, 334 FAIR EMPLOYMENT PRAC. GUIDELINES (Bureau of
Bus. Prac., Waterford, Conn.), April 25, 1993, at 4 [hereinafter Smoking in the Workplace]; see also Avery v. Powell, 695 F. Supp. 632, 639 (D.N.H. 1988) (finding that a
prisoner's assertion that prison officials exposed the inmate to environmental tobacco
smoke was sufficient to state a claim for a violation of his Eighth Amendment rights);
Shimp v. NewJersey Bell Tel. Co., 145 N.J. Super. 516, 531, 368 A.2d 408, 415-16 (Ch.
Div. 1976) (compelling an employer to conform to the common law duty to provide a
safe working environment free from the hazards of secondhand smoke).
Professor Garner examined the policies supporting smoker job protection laws,
such as employer infringement on private life, addiction, or underclass status of smokers. Donald W. Garner, ProtectingJob Opportunities of Smokers: FairTreatment for the New
Minority, 23 SETON HALL L. REV. 417, 423-28 (1993). Garner argued in favor of a
balanced approach to limiting smoker protection. Id. at 428-36. Although it is wrong
for employers to threaten a smoking employee's livelihood, Garner concluded that
such a wrong does not give rise to a civil rights violation. Id. at 430. Garner stated
that "[ t ] o assert that it is profoundly trivializes true civil rights and deeply confuses the
issue. Smokers deserve social sympathy and legal tolerance, not civil rights protection." Id. Garner also analyzed current smoker job protection laws and stressed their
disregard for public and business community interests. Id. at 436-46. Garner cited
one example that includes smoker protection laws that prohibit the employer from
charging the smoker for the costs of increased health insurance resulting from the
smoking. Id. at 437-38. Moreover, Garner commented: "The non-smoking public,
through medicare and medicaid, already pays the lion's share of smoking injuries....
Nonsmokers should not have to pay for private smokers, yet the effect of sixteen state
laws is to produce just that result." Id. at 439.
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ing bans and the employer's legal implications of such regulations.
Part II examines the employer's common law duty of care, highlighting the landmark case, Shimp v. New Jersey Bell Telephone Co. 2
Part III of this Comment describes current New Jersey and other
state statutory law concerning smoking regulations. Considerations for implementing a successful smoking policy is the focus of
Part IV, and Part V discusses the impact of collective bargaining
agreements on workplace smoking. Part VI concludes this Comment with a call for legislative action.
I.

THE EF

crs OF SMOKING IN THE WORKPLACE

The secondhand smoke, also known as sidestream smoke, produced by a burning cigarette is documented to be as much of a
carcinogenic as the mainstream smoke inhaled by smokers."l According to the National Research Council, nonsmokers exposed to
secondhand smoke absorb the equivalent of 0.1 to 1.0 cigarettes
per day.1 4 Such consistent evidence often sparks heated debates
between smokers and nonsmokers regarding occupational exposure to ETS.1 5 The National Institute for Occupational Safety and
Health (NIOSH)1 6 favored the nonsmoker in its June 1991 report
12 145 N.J. Super. 516, 368 A.2d 408 (Ch. Div. 1976). See infra notes 132-51 and
accompanying text for a complete discussion of the Shimp decision.
13 EPA REPORT, supra note 3, at 1-6. The toxic effects of these two types of smoke
are similar because both result from the combustion of tobacco. BuREAU OF Bus.
PRAc., supra note 8, at 9. Sidestream and mainstream smoke are different, however,
because the temperature of combustion during the formation of sidestream smoke is
lower than that of mainstream smoke. Id. Therefore, greater amounts of organic
constituents of smoke, such as carcinogens, are only produced when burning tobacco
forms sidestream smoke at the lower temperature. Id. Compared to mainstream
smoke, sidestream smoke, per milligram of tobacco burned, contains larger amounts
of the following: ammonia, carbon monoxide, benzene, nicotine, and the carcinogens 4-aminobipheyl, 2-napthylamine, N-nitrosamine, benzo-pyrene,
and
bexa[a]anthracene. Id. This evidences the biological plausibility that ETS is a Group
A carcinogen because sidestream smoke, like mainstream smoke, is inhaled and distributed throughout the body. EPA REPORT, supra note 3, at 1-8.
14 BuREAu OF Bus. PRAc., supa note 8, at 8. The average person spends approximately 90% of his or her time indoors. Id. at 7. Approximately 2.25 million metric
tons of gaseous, inhalable particulate matter is emitted by smokers indoors each year.
Id. at 18. Because indoor pollutant levels are substantially higher than outdoor levels,
it is not surprising that indoor air pollution ranks among the top five environmental
risks to public health. Id. at 7.
15 See Smokers' Rights: Is The Law On Their Side?, 1749 EMPLOYEE RELATIONS AND
HuMAN REsOURcEs BULLETIN (Bureau of Bus. Prac., Waterford, Conn.), Dec. 7, 1991,
at 7 [hereinafter Smokers' Rights] (observing that, as a result of the antismoking movement, "nonsmokers became more assertive and, in some cases, even sued in an effort
to assert their rights to work in a smoke-free workplace").
16 The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 established the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH). 29 U.S.C. § 671 (1989). The pur-
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on ETS in the workplace.1 7 The report stated that involuntary exposure to tobacco smoke results in an increased risk of lung cancer
and heart disease and concluded that the elimination of such
smoke from the workplace is the best method for controlling ETS
exposure. 8
A.

Employer Costs

Besides the unavoidable health consequences of secondhand
smoke, employers must conquer occupational smoker cost
problems such as low productivity and absenteeism.' 9 Two factors
directly related to smoking that have the greatest monetary impact
on a business are health insurance costs and production losses.20
pose of the NIOSH is to assure safe and healthy working conditions for every working
person in the nation and to preserve human resources. 29 U.S.C. § 651 (1989). "The
Institute is authorized to-(1) develop and establish recommended occupational
safety and health standards; and (2) perform all functions of the Secretary of Health
and Human Services under sections 669 and 670 of this title." 29 U.S.C. § 671(c)
(1989). NIOSH identifies occupational hazards by conducting inspections, participating in epidemiologic and laboratory research, publishing its findings, and recommending to regulatory agencies improvements to occupational conditions. U.S.
DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 21 CDC/NIOSH 7 (Sept. 1988).
17 NIOSH BULLETIN, supranote 10, at 12; see also BURE.AU OF Bus. PRAc., supranote
8, at 7-8 (discussing the findings of the NIOSH Current Intelligence Bulletin). NIOSH issues Current Intelligence Bulletins (CIBs) to distribute current scientific information about workplace hazards by drawing attention to a previously unrecognized
hazard, dispersing information on hazard control, or reporting innovative data on a
known hazard. NIOSH BULLETIN, supra note 10, at iii. The purpose of CIB 54 was to
distribute information regarding potential cancer risks for workers exposed to
secondhand smoke. Id.
18 NIOSH BULLETIN, supra note 10, at 12.
19 BUREAU OF Bus. PRAC., supra note 8, at 16-19. Employee absenteeism occurs
more frequently with smokers. Id. at 16. For example, in 1980, smokers stayed home
from work approximately 150 million more days than nonsmokers, in addition to 81
million more days spent sick in bed. Smoking in the Workplace, supra note 11, at 4; see
also Les Nelkin, Note, No Butts About It: Smokers Must Pay for Their Pleasure, 12 COLUM.
J. ENVTL. L. 317, 321-24 (1987) (examining the business costs to both the employee
and employer resulting from employee smoking); cf. Garner, supra note 11, at 432 ("A
central requirement of any smoker protection law must be the explicit recognition
that American business should not have foisted on its employees who can not do the
job or who do not regularly appear for work."). See generally BUREAU OF Bus. PRAc.,
supra note 8, at 16-19 (outlining the specific smoking costs to a business
organization).
20 BUREAU OF Bus. PRAc., supra note 8, at 16. For example, smoking results in an
extra $22 billion in yearly medical costs. Id. Eight percent of direct healthcare costs
are due to smoking-related illnesses, making up "more than 11% of the total economic cost of diseases in the United States." Smoking in the Workplace, supranote 11, at
4. Lost production totals another $43 billion. BUREAU OF Bus. PRAc., supra note 8, at
16. Specifically, cigarette smokers consume an estimated 30 minutes a day participating in their habit, taking valuable time away from work. Id. at 18.
Nonsmokers' productivity may also be affected. Id. For example, more than 60%
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The smoker-employee can cost an employer anywhere from $600
to $4000 per year.2" Occupational smoking, in essence, is a business cost that results from human behavior.22 In excess, such costs
equate to bad business.23
Not all costs can be rated in monetary terms, however. 24 Mortality rates of smokers also affect employers. 25 Both sudden and
premature death not only result in loss of productivity, but also
ruin company scheduling plans, place an emotional toll on coworkers, and cause the company to do more frequent hiring and
training of new employees.2 6 Other costs associated with employee
smoking include: higher fire and health insurance premiums2 7 increased accident rates, 28 maintenance and cleaning costs, 29 lower
of nonsmokers do not work well if seated in an ETS environment-especially if they
are without proper ventilation. Id. A common problem occurring at many workplaces is the "tight building syndrome." Id. at 19. Buildings that were originally constructed as energy efficient often lack outside ventilation and trap ETS. Id. Exposure
to the ETS can cause drowsiness, congestion, and irritability, in addition to irritation
of the eyes, nose, and throat. Id. at 18, 19. Proper ventilation is a key requirement
necessary to minimize the potential for worker exposure to indoor pollutants. Chris
Collett, et al., Exposure to Environmental Tobacco Smoke in California, 269 JAMA 1388,
1388 (1993).
Moreover, the majority of employers surveyed by the Research Institute of
America felt that their medical care and insurance costs rose on account of their
smoker employees. See Most companies have smoking policies, survey shows, EMPL. COORDINATOR (Research Inst. of Am., New York, N.Y.), April 14, 1988, at 4-5 [hereinafter
Research Inst. of Am.] (presenting survey results of company views on the adverse
effects of smoking). Additionally, a majority of these employers also believed that
smoking reduced productivity. Id. at 5.
21 Smoking in the Workplace, supra note 11, at 4. One management periodical stated:
"Employers can save, on average, more than $5,000 per year in health care, sick leave,
and other costs for every [smoking] employee who is persuaded to quit." The Hope
Heart Inst., supra note 7, at 6 (quotation omitted).
22 See BuREAu OF Bus. PRAC., supra note 8, at 16.
23 Id. at 15.
24 See id. at 16-17 (examining the consequences of low smoker mortality and damage to morale).
25 Id. While the average life expectancy of a thirty-year old nonsmoker is 82.7
years, the average life expectancy of a smoker of the same age is only 64.8 years. Id. at
16.
26 Id. at 16-17.
27 Id. at 17. Such premiums sometimes run 25% to 35% higher for companies that
allow occupational smoking than for companies that have a smoke-free environment.
Id.
28 Id. Employers must pay the additional workers' compensation and accidental
injury costs caused by smokers, who have double the amount of accidents as nonsmokers. Id.; see Smoking in the Workplace, supra note 11, at 4.
29 BuR.Au OF Bus. PRAc., supra note 8, at 17. Tobacco smoke causes a film to form
on glass, walls, and other surfaces. Id. Cigarette burns cause damage to commercial
furnishings. Id. Also, time must be spent in emptying and cleaning ash trays. Id.
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employee morale,3 ° and reduced3 sales resulting from customer repulsion to an ETS environment. 1
Additionally, employers are faced with workers' compensation
32
costs
and court imposed remedies to ETS exposure:.3 Of greater
concern to employers, is the fact that, in addition to irreparable
monetary losses, a court injunction prohibiting smoking may permanently affect an employer's legal rights.3 4 Furthermore, if the

employer fails to comply with state smoking regulations, the employer will be exposed to other legal penalties.3 5
Although the NewJersey courts have not had to settle an ETSworkers' compensation dispute, the chancery division in Shimp v.
30 Id. at 17-18. A smoke-free workplace allows for a cleaner and healthier work
environment and generates greater rapport between co-workers. Id. at 17.
31 Id. at 18. Nonsmoking customers may not want to enter an environment which
exposes them to ETS. Id.
32 Id. at 11. Various commentators have remarked on the issue of workers' compensation laws and the available remedies for ETS exposure. For example, one suggests that employees injured from ETS exposure should seek monetary compensation
instead of injunctive relief. See Christian G. Krupp, II, Comment, Warning! Working In
A Smoke Filled Room Is Dangerous To Your Health: ProtectingMichigan Workers From Exposure To Environmental Tobacco Smoke, 7 COOLE L. REv. 509, 515 (1990). This position
was supported by a survey of recent cases where the plaintiffs relied on state workers'
compensation statutes in pursuit of damages claims from workplace ETS. Id. at 51519. In addition, the author focused on the Michigan Workers' Compensation Act and
how it may apply to future workplace ETS cases. Id. at 519-21. Another commentator
analyzed state unemployment compensation cases and placed them in the workers'
compensation context. See John C. Fox, Smoking In The Workplace: Who Has What
Rights?, 11 CAMPBELL L. REv. 311, 314, 319-21, 330 (1989) (asserting that the majority
of employees do not have legal or statutory smoking "rights" concerning workplace
smoking).
In North Carolina, workplace injuries are compensable only if they occur during
the course of employment. Donna S. Stroud, When Two "Rights" Make A Wrong: The
Protection Of Nonsmokers'Rights In The Workplace, 11 CAMPBELL L. REv. 339, 355 (1989).
New Mexico case law, on the other hand, allows an employee to receive workers'
compensation benefits if he or she is injured by smoke. Id. at 355-56. Other issues
surrounding compensation include employer avoidance of liability and nonsmoker
policy concerns and protection. Id. at 356-60. Another commentator examined
whether the exclusive remedy provisions of the Washington Workers' Compensation
Act bar workplace ETS damage claims. Raymond L. Paolella, The Legal Rights of Nonsmokers in the Workplace, 10 U. PUGET SOUND L. REv. 591, 603-12 (1987). The harmful
effects of ETS exposure no doubt play a crucial role in influencing the court's creation of legal remedies for nonsmokers. Id. at 592-97. A significant consideration is
the nonsmoker's common law right to a healthy and safe workplace. Id. at 597-615.
Concerning statutory law, a sensitive smoker may qualify as a "handicapped person"
and be able to obtain a smoke-free workplace under applicable statutes. Id. at 615.
33 See Shimp v. New Jersey Bell Tel. Co., 145 NJ. Super. 516, 524, 368 A.2d 408,
412 (Ch. Div. 1976) (asserting that although the New Jersey Workmen's Compensation Act limits monetary recoveries, it "is silent with respect to the question of injunctive relief against occupational hazards").
34 See id.
35 See BUREAU OF

Bus. PRAc., supra note 8, at 10-14.
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New Jersey Bell Telephone Co. 6 found that the Workmen's Compensation Act (Act)3 7 did not affect the authority of the court to issue
injunctive relief for employee exposure to secondhand smoke.3 8 .
The chancery court declared that the Act exclusively covers monetary recoveries for past employee injuries, but is silent as to injunctive relief for continuing occupational hazards.3 9 The court's dicta
implied that, in New Jersey, an employer may reasonably expect
ETS-related illnesses to fall under the Act.40 This may be a relief
for employees, who may now be able to recover under the Act for
their ETS illnesses.4" The current EPA report and its findings can
only solidify nonsmokers' proof in workers' compensation hearings
that respiratory illnesses are in fact caused by workplace ETS.4 2 For
example, if an employer permits such exposure to occur at work,
asthmatic employees may be eligible for workers' compensation.4 "
36 145 N.J. Super. at 531, 368 A.2d at 416 (entitling a nonsmoker employee to
enjoin an employer to prevent involuntary exposure to secondhand smoke). See infra
note 133 for a list of law review articles examining Shimp and the common law right to
a safe and healthy workplace.
37 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 34:15-1 to -128 (West 1988). Section 34:15-1 states the
following:
When personal injury is caused to an employee by accident arising out
of and in the course of his employment, of which the actual or lawfully
imputed negligence of the employer is the natural and proximate
cause, he shall receive compensation therefor from his employer, provided the employee was himself not willfully negligent at the time of
receiving such injury, and the question of whether the employee was
willfully negligent shall be one of fact to be submitted to the jury, subject to the usual superintending powers of a court to'set aside a verdict
rendered contrary to the evidence.
§ 34:15-1.
38 Shimp, 145 N.J. Super. at 524, 368 A.2d at 412. The court found that secondhand smoke was an occupational hazard. Id. at 530-31, 368 A.2d at 415-16.
39 Id. at 524, 368 A.2d at 412.
40 See id. at 524, 530-31, 368 A.2d at 412, 415-16.
41 See BuREAU OF Bus. PRAc., supra note 8, at 12.
42 Id. For example, asthma, a common respiratory problem, may develop as a result of ETS exposure. Id. at 11-12 (citingJohannesen v. New York City Dep't of Housing Preservation & Dev., 546 N.Y.S.2d 40, 41 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989)). Studies
demonstrated that ETS exposure results in an estimated 8,000 to 26,000 yearly cases
of childhood asthma where mothers smoke a minimum of 10 cigarettes a day. EPA
REPORT, supra note 3, at 1-15. Two-hundred thousand asthmatic children also suffer
substantially aggravated symptoms from ETS exposure. Id.
43 SeeJohannesen, 546 N.Y.S.2d at 41. In Johannesen, the plaintiff, Veronica Johannesen, worked with smokers and suffered two asthma attacks requiring emergency
room treatment. Id. Johannesen claimed that the asthma resulted from ETS exposure at work and filed for workers' compensation benefits. Id. at 40. The New York
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, upheld the Workers' Compensation Board's
award of benefits, articulating that the time and place of the asthma attacks evidenced
an accidental injury. Id. at 41 (citations omitted).
Additionally, in McCarthy v. Department of Social and Health Services, respondent
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As a result the employer will incur higher workers' compensation
costs."
B.

Americans with DisabilitiesAct of 1990 and the Rehabilitation Act

According to the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 4
workplace smoking restrictions do not violate the law. 46 To date,
there are no cases decided under the ADA addressing smoking in
Helen McCarthy was similarly exposed to ETS at work and developed a disabling pulmonary disease. McCarthy v. Dep't of Social & Health Servs., 759 P.2d 351, 352
(Wash. 1988). The disease reduced pulmonary function and caused broncho-spasm
as well as sensitivity to tobacco smoke. Id. McCarthy's physician stated that his patient
could not perform her occupational duties in an area polluted by tobacco smoke. Id.
McCarthy filed this claim for negligence after the Department of Labor and Industries denied her claim for workers' compensation benefits. Id. The court held that
McCarthy could not be collaterally estopped from asserting her negligence claim if
she could prove her condition was not covered by the Washington Industrial Insurance Act. Id. at 358. The court remanded the case so that McCarthy could demonstrate that the occupational disease was not part of the Act. Id. Along the lines of
Shimp, Johannesen, and McCarthy, two Connecticut nonsmokers recently filed workers'
compensation claims based on the 1993 EPA report. See Smoking in the Workplace, supra
note 11, at 5.
44 BuREAu OF Bus. PRAc., supra note 8, at 11.
45 Act of July 26, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, §§ 101-514, 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. (104
Stat.) 327 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1201). The Code of Federal Regulations states the
purpose of the ADA as follows:
The ADA is a Federal antidiscrimination statute designed to remove
barriers which prevent qualified individuals with disabilities from enjoying the same employment opportunities that are available to persons
without disabilities.
Like the Civil Rights Act of 1964 that prohibits discrimination on
the bases of race, color, religion, national origin, and sex, the ADA
seeks to ensure access to equal employment opportunities based on
merit. It does not guarantee equal results, establish quotas, or require
preferences favoring individuals with disabilities over those without
disabilities.
... When an individual's disability creates a barrier to employment
opportunities, the ADA requires employers to consider whether reasonable accommodation could remove the barrier.
...
[U]nless to do so would impose an undue hardship. Such accommodations usually take the form of adjustments to the way a job
customarily is performed, or to the work environment itself
Interpretive Guidance on Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 29 C.F.R. app.
§ 1630 (1993) (emphasis added). The Code of Federal Regulations defines undue
hardship as: "[A]ny accommodation that would be unduly costly, extensive, substantial, or disruptive, or that would fundamentally alter the nature or operation of the
business." 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(p). The Act is enforced by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.
46 29 C.F.R. § 1630.16(d). Under regulation of smoking, the Code of Federal Regulations states: "A covered entity may prohibit or impose restrictions on smoking in
places of employment. Such restrictions do not violate any provision of this part." Id.
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the workplace.4 7 As a result, there is no precedent to answer
whether the employer must reasonably accommodate nonsmokers
who are disabled as a result of ETS sensitivity.4" The Rehabilitation
Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act) ,49 designed to guarantee equal opportunity for handicapped individuals has been applied in ETS
cases 50 and could provide courts with an example of how to decide
this question under the ADA.5 '
For example, in Vickers v. Veterans Administration,5 2 an employer allegedly failed to provide a smoke-free workplace for a nonsmoking employee who claimed to be "handicapped" as a result of
his allergy to tobacco smoke.53 Even though the court decided that
the employee's allergy was a disability, and that the Rehabilitation
Act prohibited employer discrimination toward the disabled, the
United States District Court for the District of Western Washington
held the employer not liable for damages.54 The court found that
BuREAu OF Bus. PRAC., supra note 8, at 10.
48 See id.
49 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796i (1989). Section 701 states:
The purpose of this chapter is to develop and implement, through research, training, services, and the guarantee of equal opportunity, comprehensive and coordinated programs of vocational rehabilitation and
independent living, for individuals with handicaps in order to maximize
their employability, independence, and integration into the workplace
and the community.
§ 701.
50 See Vickers v. Veterans Admin., 549 F. Supp. 85 (W.D. Wash. 1982). The Vickers
court determined that a nonsmoker was a "handicapped person" under the Rehabilitation Act because of his hypersensitivity to tobacco smoke. Id. at 86-87. The court
did not find a duty on the part of the employer, however, to provide a smoke-free
work environment. Id. at 87.
51 But Au OF Bus. PRtc., supra note 8, at 10. For an in-depth explanation of the
laws protecting handicapped persons, see Paolella, supra note 32, at 615-23.
52 549 F. Supp. 85 (W.D. Wash. 1982).
53 Id. at 86.
54 Id. at 87, 90. The court found the employee to be a "handicapped individual"
for the purposes of the federal statute because the employee's acute sensitivity to an
ETS environment inhibited his lifetime employment activity. Id. at 86, 87. The Rehabilitation Act defines an "individual with handicaps" as: "[A]ny person who (i) has a
physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of such person's major life activities, (ii) has a record of such an impairment, or (iii) is regarded
as having such an impairment." 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B) (Supp. 11 1991).
Vickers serves as a partial victory for nonsmokers who are hypersensitive because
they may now be considered handicapped for the purposes of the Americans with
Disabilities Act. See BuREAu OF Bus. PRAc., supra note 8, at 11. For example, Harmerv.
Virginia Electric and Power Co. involved an employee who brought an action against his
employer for failing to establish a smoke-free work environment and, therefore, failing to provide reasonable workplace accommodations. Harmer v. Virginia Elec. &
Power Co., No. 93-CV-168, 1993 WL 365132, at *1 (E.D. Va. Sept. 20, 1993). The
district court stated:
In drafting the ADA, Congress consciously drew on the law that devel47
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the Veterans Administration had no duty to provide a smoke-free
environment to accommodate the nonsmoking employee. 55 Aboped under the Rehabilitation Act, and the legislative history of the
ADA indicates that reasonable accommodation is to be interpreted consistently with the regulations implemented under ... the Rehabilitation
Act.... Therefore, cases brought under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,
29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq., can shed some light on Harmer's case.
Id. at *5 (citation omitted). In contrast, the Court of Appeals of North Carolina,
interpreting the same provision of the Rehabilitation Act, did not find persons who
claim a pulmonary problem or discomfort when exposed to ETS to be "handicapped." GASP v. Mecklenburg County, 256 S.E.2d 477, 479 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979).
The Ninth Circuit also found a nonsmoking employee to be disabled under 5
U.S.C. § 8331(6). Parodi v. Merit Sys. Protection Bd., 690 F.2d 731, 738-39 (9th Cir.
1982). Irene Parodi, a federal employee, worked in a smoke-filled office. Id. at 733.
Parodi's doctor advised her to take a leave of absence because she developed pulmonary difficulties and asthmatic bronchitis as a result of ETS exposure. Id. The court
found the plaintiff to be disabled under 5 U.S.C. § 8331(6), describing her disability
as an "environmental limitation" that rendered her unable to perform in a smokefilled workplace. Id. at 738. The court noted that Parodi's claim was novel, yet determined this hypersensitivity to be similar to other diseases under the statute. Id. The
court quoted the statute, stating that a person is completely disabled if he or she is
'unable to perform 'useful and efficient service in the grade or class of position last
occupied by the employee or Member because of disease or injury not due to vicious
habits, intemperance, or willful misconduct on his part within five years before becoming so disabled.'" Id. at 737 (quotation and footnote omitted). The United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that a hypersensitive employee,
absent from work due to problems caused by smoke, may receive disability benefits if
the government does not provide a worksite with a smoke-free environment. Id. at
737, 740; see also Stroud, supra note 32, at 352-53 (discussing a hypersensitive employee's possible entitlement to disability benefits emphasizing the Parodi decision).
55 Vickers, 549 F. Supp. at 87. Even though the employer did not have a duty to
accommodate the nonsmoker employee, the Vickers court found the following employer actions as reasonable: separating the smokers' and non-smoker's desks; enforcing an agreement between smokers and the nonsmoking employee that no one
could smoke at the non-smoker's desk; and, installing two vents in the ceiling above
the non-smoker's desk. Id. at 88. The employer also offered to enclose the employee's office and, as a last resort, offered him a transfer to a maintenance job outdoors. Id.; see also Doe v. Boeing Co., 846 P.2d 531, 537 (Wash. 1993) (requiring an
employer to take only those steps reasonably necessary to facilitate the job performance of a handicapped employee) (citations omitted).
The employer is required to make reasonable accommodations for ETS-sensitive
handicapped employees unless the accommodations are an "undue hardship" on the
employer. SeeAct ofJuly 26, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, § 101 (10), 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N.
(104 Stat.) 331 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12111). The ADA describes "undue hardship"
as:
[A) n action requiring significant difficulty or expense, when considered
in light of the factors set forth in subparagraph (B).
(B) FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED.-In determining whether
an accommodation would impose an undue hardship on a covered entity, factors to be considered include(i) the nature and cost of the accommodation needed
under this Act;
(ii) the overall financial resources of the facility or facilities involved in the provision of the reasonable accommodation;
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sent a regulation or statute forbidding smoking, the court articulated, employers must carefully balance the rights of smoker and
nonsmoker employees. 6 Until the adoption of such legislation,
the court concluded, smokers had rights that could not be ignored
or discarded.5 7
The Vickers court suggested that an employee's sensitivity to
tobacco smoke, considered a disability under the Rehabilitation
Act, may also be a disability under the ADA.5" If a claimed disability resulting from ETS is upheld by a court, the employer must
then make reasonable accommodations for that employee under
the ADA or prepare for legal consequences similar to those under
the Rehabilitation Act.59 Employer policies can prohibit or restrict
workplace smoking, as stated in ADA section 501 (b).6 Conversely,
the number of persons employed at such facility; the effect on
expenses and resources, or the impact otherwise of such accommodation upon the operation of the facility;
(iii) the overall financial resources of the covered entity;
the overall size of the business of a covered entity with respect to
the number of its employees; the number, type, and location of
its facilities; and
(iv) the type of operation or operations of the covered entity, including the composition, structure, and functions of the
workforce of such entity; the geographic separateness, administrative, or fiscal relationship of the facility or facilities in question
to the covered entity.
Id. Substantial workplace smoking restrictions, however, will often cut employer costs,
benefitting both the employer and employees in the long run. Paolella, supra note
32, at 622.
56 Vickers, 549 F. Supp. at 89.
57 Id.
58 BuREAu OF Bus. PRAc., supra note 8, at 11. Vickers also suggests that employers
must be prepared to "consider the fact that designated smoking areas might not be
sufficient" accommodations for nonsmoking employees who are especially sensitive to
cigarette smoke. Id.
59 Id. The ADA describes "reasonable accommodation" as:
(A) making existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to
and usable by individuals with disabilities; and
(B) job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or modification of equipment or
devices, appropriate adjustment or modifications of examinations, training materials or policies, the provision of qualified readers or interpreters, and other similar accommodations for individuals with disabilities.
Act ofJuly 26, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, § 101(9), 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. (104 Stat.) 331
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12111).
60 Act of July 26, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, § 501(b), 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. (104
Stat.) 369 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12201). ADA § 501(b) reads:
RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER LAws-Nothing in this Act shall be construed

to invalidate or limit the remedies, rights, and procedures of any Federal law or law of any State or political subdivision of any State orjurisdiction that provides greater or equal protection for the rights of
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the ADA does not specifically allow a smoker employee to bring an
action for an employer's failure to provide reasonable accommodations for the employee's smoking habit.6 1
C.

Unemployment Compensation

On occasion, an employee will quit his or her job because of
an employer's refusal to implement a no-smoking policy, resulting
in a suit against the employer for unemployment compensation
benefits. 6 2 Although there is currently no NewJersey case law available on the subject, cases in other jurisdictions have been decided
both for and against the nonsmoking employee.6 3 In Alexander v.
CaliforniaUnemployment InsuranceAppeals Board,' a California court
granted a writ of mandate compelling the California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board to pay unemployment insurance
benefits to the plaintiff.6 5 Having an allergy to cigarette smoke, the
plaintiff quit her job because the employer refused to enforce its
no-smoking policy.6 6 The appeals court found that the presence of
individuals with disabilities than are afforded by this Act. Nothing in
this Act shall be construed to preclude the prohibition of, or the imposition of restrictions on, smoking in places of employment covered by
title I, in transportation covered by title II or III, or in places of public
accommodation covered by title III.
Id.

61 BuREAu OF Bus. PRAc., supra note 8, at 11. This position assumes the employee
is challenging a no-smoking policy. Id.
62 See, e.g., McCrocklin v. Employment Dev. Dep't, 205 Cal. Rptr. 156, 160 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1984) (concluding that an employee who feared ETS exposure at the workplace
left his job in good faith and was therefore entitled to unemployment benefits); Alexander v. California Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 163 Cal. Rptr. 411, 412 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1980) (compelling an employer to pay unemployment benefits to an employee
who left an ETS work environment for good cause); Lapham v. Commonwealth Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 519 A.2d 1101, 1103 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1987) (finding an employer liable for unemployment compensation benefits to an
employee who suffered negative health effects from workplace ETS exposure after the
employer failed to reasonably accommodate him). But see Rotenberg v. Industrial
Comm'n, 590 P.2d 521, 522, 523 (Colo. Ct. App. 1979) (declaring that employee discomfort alone was not enough to qualify for unemployment compensation benefits);
Beecham v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 36 N.W.2d 233, 233, 236 (Neb. 1949) (determining that employee lacked sufficient evidence to prove detrimental effects of workplace
ETS on his health and therefore did not qualify for unemployment benefits); Ruckstuhl v. Commonwealth Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 426 A.2d 719,
721, 722 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1981) (denying compensation benefits to an employee who
failed to show medical evidence of harm resulting from workplace ETS exposure).
63 See Paolella, supra note 32, at 630-31 (discussing cases where unemployment
compensation was given to nonsmoking employees).
64 163 Cal. Rptr. 411 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980).
65 Alexander, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 412, 413.
66 Id. According to the plaintiff's doctor, Marilyn Alexander could continue her
employment only if her work environment remained smoke-free. Id.
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ETS was injurious to the plaintiff's health and, therefore, good
cause existed for the plaintiffs rejection of a smoke-filled workplace.6 7 Alexander is clearly a victory for nonsmoking employees
whose employers do not enforce no-smoking policies, a precedent
that New Jersey will hopefully follow.6"
A subsequent California case, McCrocklin v. Employment Development Department,6 9 held that a nonsmoking employee, who left his
employment because of exposure to secondhand smoke, did so
reasonably and in good faith, and therefore was entitled to unemployment benefits. 70 In McCrocklin, smokers surrounded the employee's work station, which was located in an enclosed and
unventilated area.7 It is important to note that, unlike the preceding cases, the employee was not allergic to cigarette smoke, but
merely found it repulsive.72 The court stated that McCrocklin's
employment did not encompass-nor could he reasonably anticipate-breathing tobacco smoke at the worksite.73 Therefore, the
court asserted, McCrocklin did not assume such a risk. 4
A similar finding occurred in Lapham v. Commonwealth Unemployment Compensation Board of Review.75 Lapham involved a woman
67 Id. The court applied a two-part test, previously established by the California
judiciary: (1) the claimant must be willing to accept appropriate work for which there
is no good cause for refusal, and (2) must be open to a sizable field of employment.
Id. at 412 (citation omitted); see also Ellis v. Iowa Dep't ofJob Serv., 285 N.W.2d 153,
157 (Iowa 1979) (holding that a rectory housekeeper, allergic to the rectory Christmas tree, left her employment for good cause and thus was entitled to unemployment
benefits); McComber v. Iowa Employment Sec. Comm'n, 119 N.W.2d 792, 794, 795
(Iowa 1963) (deciding that an employee allergic to the woolen materials she worked
with left her job for good cause); Harris v. Woodcrest Mobile Homes, 359 So. 2d 243,
245 (La. Ct. App. 1978) (stating that a carpenter allergic to fiberboard dust left for
good cause and was entitled to unemployment benefits); Fannon v. Federal Cartridge
Corp., 18 N.W.2d 249, 252 (Minn. 1945) (articulating that an ordnance plant employee allergic to gunpowder was justified in leaving herjob); Sledzianowski v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 76 A.2d 666, 668 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1950)
(finding that an employee had good cause to refuse a new job offer as paint sprayer
because of an allergy to paint).
68 See Alexander, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 412-13.
69 205 Cal. Rptr. 156 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
70 Id. at 160.
71 Id. at 157. The use of two fans in McCrocklin's cubicle did not eliminate the
smoke, but rather created the additional problem of too much wind. Id. The employer promised to help solve the problem but did nothing. Id. Eventually McCrocklin worked nights and weekends to avoid the smoke exposure. Id.
72 Id. This holding allows any nonsmoker to receive unemployment compensation
benefits due to exposure to ETS, regardless of whether the person is allergic or
merely hypersensitive. See id. at 160.

73 Id.
74 Id.
75 519 A.2d 1101, 1102-03 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1987).
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who resigned from her position because exposure to ETS in the
workplace caused her allergic bronchitis. 76 The Commonwealth
Court of Pennsylvania granted unemployment compensation benefits to the plaintiff, finding that the plaintiff left her job because
her employer failed to offer reasonable accommodations from
nonsmokers. 77 The court recognized that the effects of toxic tobacco smoke are injurious and deleterious to the health of smokers
78
and nonsmokers alike.
Other court decisions, however, have not been so favorable to
the nonsmoker. 79 In Ruckstuhl v. Commonwealth Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 80 a Pennsylvania case representative of
76

Id. at 1101.

77 Id. at 1102, 1103. The court stated that an employee must submit medical evi-

dence of the ailment, as well as demonstrate that the employee explained to the employer both the medical condition and the inability to perform his or her job. Id. at
1102. The employer, the Lapham court articulated, must then offer the employee a
reasonable accommodation not detrimental to one's health. Id. The Pennsylvania
court also decided that the employer failed to offer such accommodation. Id. The
court agreed with the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review that the new
work area offered to the employee was vulnerable to infiltrating tobacco smoke and,
therefore, of no help to the nonsmoking employee. Id. at 1103.
78 Id. at 1102.
79 See, e.g., Rotenberg v. Industrial Comm'n, 590 P.2d 521, 523 (Colo. Ct. App.
1979) (refusing unemployment compensation benefits to an employee who did not
support the indication of "unsatisfactory or hazardous" working conditions); Wolfgram v. Employment Sec. Agency, 291 P.2d 279, 280, 282 (Idaho 1955) (holding that
a miner who refused to work in a mine after developing a heat rash was not entitled to
unemployment compensation); Valenti v. Board of Review of Unemployment Compensation of N.J., 4 N.J. 287, 290-92, 72 A.2d 516, 517-18 (1950) (refusing to grant
unemployment compensation to a claimant who rejected employment other than
that in her own home because of allergy to vehicular transportation); Beecham v.
Falstaff Brewing Corp., 36 N.W.2d 233, 236 (Neb. 1949) (finding asthmatic bronchitis
to be an insufficient condition to support a cause of action for unemployment benefits); Johnson v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 125 A.2d 458, 459-60
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1956) (denying employment compensation benefits to a sandblaster
allergic to dust); Ruckstuhl v. Commonwealth Unemployment Compensation Bd. of
Review, 426 A.2d 719, 722 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1981) (denying unemployment compensation benefits to an employee who failed to show sufficient evidence of a medical
detriment due to ETS); Baldassano v. Commonwealth Unemployment Compensation
Bd. of Review, 383 A.2d 988, 989, 990 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1978) (refusing employment
compensation benefits to an inspector who left her job because of allergy to dust);
McQuiston v. Commonwealth Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 390 A.2d
317, 317-18, 319 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1978) (stating that an army social worker who terminated her employment because of allergies and a sinus condition aggravated by the
atmospheric conditions at her location was not entitled to employment compensation
benefits); Baker v. Commonwealth Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 336
A.2d 671, 673, 674 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1975) (declining employment compensation to a
micro-photography machine operator who quit her job after her doctor advised her
that she suffered from hypertension and an allergy to ammonia).
80 426 A.2d 719 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1981).
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other jurisdictions, the plaintiff allegedly became ill due to exposure to ETS and quit her job.8 ' The court denied unemployment
compensation, stating that cigarette smoke, although harmful to
both smokers and nonsmokers, was not so detrimental to one's
health as to justify an employee's voluntary termination of employment and grant of employee benefits. 8 2 Similar cases pronounced
that the employee must present evidence of hazardous or unsatisfactory working conditions to be eligible for unemployment compensation benefits.8 " In a case which granted the least amount of
protection to nonsmokers, the Nebraska Supreme Court determined that a doctor's statement indicating a condition of asthmatic bronchitis was insufficient evidence to support the
conclusion that a smoke-filled work environment was detrimental
4
to an employee's health .
D. HiringPolicies and Off-Duty Smoking Bans
In response to the costs of smoker employees, a growing
number of employers have cut those costs simply by refusing to
8 5
hire smokers and/or implementing a ban on off-duty smoking.
In some instances, such as a fire department concerned about the
physical fitness of its employees, strict hiring policies and smoking
81 Id. at 721. Due to a nicotine allergy, the plaintiff had difficulty breathing when
exposed to excessive secondhand smoke. Id.
82 Id. at 722. The court treated the case as a typical voluntary termination case
involving health reasons. Id. at 721 (citation omitted). The court enumerated the
following requirements for unemployment compensation benefits: (1) the claimant
must give sufficient testimony that his or her health necessitated the termination; (2)
the claimant must inform the employer of the health condition; and, (3) the claimant
must specifically request a transfer to a more conducive position or location. Id. (quotation omitted). Because she failed to show medical evidence of her condition at the
time she terminated employment, the Ruckstuhl court found that the nonsmoking
employee did not meet such requirements. Id. at 722.
83 Rotenberg, 590 P.2d at 523; see also Douglas Massengill & Donald J. Petersen,
Smokers vs. Nonsmokers in the Work Place: Clearing the Air, 10 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 505,
512-13 (1984-85) (discussing whether an employee is entitled to unemployment compensation after voluntary termination of employment focusing on two cases, Rotenberg
and Ruckstuho.
84 Beecham v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 36 N.W.2d 233, 236 (Neb. 1949); see also
Billman v. Sumrall, 464 So. 2d 382, 385 (La. Ct. App. 1985) (denying unemployment
benefits because the court found that an employee's preexisting allergy was not "good
cause" for resignation: the allergy was not aggravated by the employee's position).
85 See generally Garner, supra note 11 (discussing the legality and implementation of
off-duty smoking bans); Thomas W. Sculco, Note, Smokers' Rights Legislation: Should
The State "Butt Out" Of The Workplace?, 33 B.C. L. REv. 879 (1992) (addressing the
policy implications of off-duty smoking bans and smokers' rights legislation); Smokers'
Rights, supra note 15, at 7-8 (examining the rights of smokers with regard to off-duty
prohibitions).
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bans were legitimate employer interests. 8 6 In recent years, however, a majority of states have passed or considered passing smoker
job protection laws.87 When an employer's goal is to lower health
care expenses and not to protect the public health, a hire-onlynonsmokers policy or an off-duty smoking ban is not justifiable.8 8
Nonsmoker hiring policies and off-duty smoking bans not only
cross the line protecting smokers' rights and privacy,8 9 they are
illegal.9"
E.

OccupationalSafety and Health Administration

The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (Safety and
Health Act), authorizes the Secretary of Labor to provide a
mandatory policy for all employers to maintain a safe and healthy
86 See Grusendorfv. City of Oklahoma City, 816 F.2d 539, 543 (10th Cir. 1987). In
Grusendor, a firefighter trainee was fired for smoking on his lunch break after signing
an agreement not to smoke on or off duty. Id. at 540. The firefighter filed suit and
claimed the department violated his constitutional rights of privacy, property, liberty,
and due process. Id. The court held that the nonsmoking policy rationally promoted
the health and safety of the firefighters. Id. at 543. The court added that one "need
look no further for a legitimate purpose and rational connection than the Surgeon
General's warning on the side of every box of cigarettes sold in this country that
cigarette smoking is hazardous to health." Id.
Smoking restrictions may be permitted if the smoking results in a conflict of interest. Smoking in the Workplace, supra note 11, at 5. The following occupations are
examples: antismoking counselors, health club employees, employees of religious organizations that do not allow tobacco use, and professional athletes. Id.
87 See Garner, supra note 11, at 422 & n.33 (listing the 25 states that had passed
such laws by August, 1992). For example, the New Jersey smoker job protection law
states:
No employer shall refuse to hire or employ any person or shall discharge from employment or take any adverse action against any employee with respect to compensation, terms, conditions or other
privileges of employment because that person does or does not smoke
or use other tobacco products, unless the employer has a rational basis
for doing so which is reasonably related to the employment, including
the responsibilities of the employee or prospective employee.
NJ. STAT. ANN. § 34:6B-1 (West Supp. 1993).
88 See Garner, supra note 11, at 423-24; Smokers'Rights, supra note 15, at 7. A prohibition against tobacco smoking at work is beneficial because it promotes public
health, while merely inconveniencing the smoker employee. Garner, supranote 11, at
425.
89 Garner, supra note 11, at 424; see also Smokers'Rights, supra note 15, at 7 (noting
that legislators responded to the outcries of smokers' rights activists by enacting legislation to protect such rights).
90 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:6B-1 (West Supp. 1993). In states without a smoker
protection law, courts may recognize a general privacy right and, therefore, challenge
employer off-duty smoking rules. BuREAu OF Bus. PRAc., supra note 8, at 14; cf. RichardJ. Brightman, Note, 24 SETON HALL L. REv. 483, 513-14 (1993) (confronting the
controversy between public policy protecting safety and the employee's right to privacy, as applied to random drug testing).
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The Safety and Health Act's general duty clause

promulgates that an employer has a duty to remove any foreseeable and preventable hazards.9 2 To coordinate enforcement efforts, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)
and the EPA agreed to work together to enforce their respective
areas of concurrent jurisdiction over workplace and environmental
hazards.9" Topics included in the agreement are joint inspections,

data exchange, agency referrals of alleged violations, and agency
personnel cross-training programs.9 4
Such regulations at the federal or state level, however, may not
be enough because OSHA places the legal responsibility to provide
a healthy and safe workplace on the employer.9 5 New Jersey must
29 U.S.C. § 651(b)(3) (1989).
29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1) (1989). The general duty clause states that each employer "shall furnish to each of his employees employment and a place of employment which are free from recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause
death or serious physical harm to his employees." Id.
93 Memorandum Of UnderstandingBetween The OccupationalSafety And Health Administration And The Environmental Protection Agency On Minimizing Workplace And Environmental Hazards, 21 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) 7271, 7271 (Nov. 23, 1990) [hereinafter
Memorandum]. The purpose of the memorandum is "to establish and improve the
working relationship between" the EPA and OSHA. Id. It is the statutory duty of both
agencies to protect public health and safety as well as the safety and health of
America's workforce. Id.; see also GEORGE R. SALEM, LABOR LAw Dxvs., Recent Developments in the Law at the United States Departmentof Labor§ 3.02(6), at 3-17 (1992) (noting
that OSHA and the EPA teamed up to investigate and share information on a fatal gas
and chemical company explosion).
94 Memorandum, supra note 93, at 7273-74. The EPA does not conduct occupational safety inspections; however, employees may address their concerns regarding
existing workplace hazards to the agency, which will notify OSHA contacts. Id. at
7273. OSHA, in turn, will inform the EPA on the following matters:
a. Worker allegations of significant adverse reactions to a chemical or
chemical substance which poses a potential hazard to public health or
the environment.
b. Accidental, unpermitted, or deliberate releases of chemicals or
chemical substances beyond the workplace.
c. Unsafe handling, storage, or use practices involving chemicals,
chemical substances, or waste materials in apparent violation of EPAadministered laws.
d. Other readily detectible potential violations of EPA-administered
laws, such as by-passing treatment systems.
e. Asbestos dispersal or contamination affecting the public or the
environment.
Id. The two agencies will also exchange information, such as: complaints, investigation inspections, discovered violations, and pertinent information needed to ensure
law enforcement. Id.
95 See MouNT SiNAI ScH. OF MED. OF THE CrrY UNIV. OF N.Y., OcCUPATIONAL DisEASE IN NEwJERsEY, REPORT TO THE N.J. DEP'T OF HEALTH 92, 94 (Dec. 1989). OSHA
is only able to inspect a few of the many industries in the nation. Id. at 92-93. Joint
management labor-safety committees are needed in the workplace to ensure employ91

92
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take the necessary steps to increase employee participation, which
will ensure safe and healthy worksites.9 6 The ongoing participation
of New Jersey employees will also help OSHA monitor workplace
hazards.9 7 These efforts are necessary to eliminate workplace
hazards such as occupational illness, injury, and death.98
The question remains as to whether ETS is a foreseeable and
preventable workplace hazard. 99 OSHA can issue an emergency
standard if the agency believes that it is necessary to protect employees from dangerous toxic substances in the workplace.'
OSHA, however, has not issued a temporary emergency workplace
smoking ban despite the EPA's finding that ETS exposure is harmful to one's health. 01'
There is considerable federal case law setting precedent for
treating smoking as a hazard under the Safety and Health Act. 10 2
For example, nonsmoking federal agency employees filed suit for
declaratory and injunctive relief restricting federal workplace
smoking in Federal Employees For Non-Smokers' Rights (FENSR) v.
ees of protection from occupational hazards. Id. at 93. Such management should
include internal assessment, decision-making, and monitoring, all of which could
help ease the heavy burden of widespread toxic exposures and occupational disease.
Id.
96 Id. at 92. There is a need to develop managers and workers who are both "vigilant and proactive" in recognizing and ameliorating workplace hazards. Id. Such development is necessary in creating workplaces that have a minimal risk of disease or
injury. Id.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 93. For example, between 1980 and 1985, OSHA found overexposure to
lead and silica hazards in 30% to 50% of NewJersey's inspected high-risk industries.
Id. at 92. Despite such OSHA regulation of high-risk industries, OSHA is unable to
inspect the majority of the actual workplaces in those industries. Id. at 92-93. Only six
to nine percent of high-risk workplaces were inspected for lead and silica throughout
the six year period. Id. at 93. OSHA inspected lead and silica more than any other
chemical hazard. Id. This is why internal controls, such as employees working with
management to identify and remove on-the-job hazards, must be added to the list of
external controls, such as governmental regulations. Id. at 92.
99 See Shimp v. NewJersey Bell Tel. Co., 145 N.J. Super. 516, 525-26, 368 A.2d 408,
413 (Ch. Div. 1976); see also Stroud, supra note 32, at 346-48 (addressing the Occupational Safety and Health Act of North Carolina and its application to the smoke-filled
workplace).
100 Smokers' Rights, supra note 15, at 7.
101 Id. The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals held that OSHA's decision not to issue the temporary emergency standard banning workplace smoking was
reasonable. Action on Smoking & Health v. OSHA, 15 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1030, 1031
(D.C. Cir. 1991); see SALEM, supra note 93, § 3.02[6],at3-16. A toxic substance must
pose a "grave danger" to employees at the workplace in order for OSHA to have the
authority to issue a temporary emergency ban. Action on Smoking, 15 O.S.H. Cas.
(BNA) at 1031. There must also be a "necessity" to issue the temporary standard. Id.
102 See infra notes 103-06 and accompanying text for the applicability of OSHA to
federal cases involving workplace hazards such as secondhand smoke.
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United States.1 °3 The United States District Court for the District of

Columbia found that the Safety and Health Act did not provide a
private cause of action because its definition of "employer" did not
include the United States. 10 4 Despite the limited applicability of
this case, Congress intended the Safety and Health Act to regulate
employer elimination of foreseeable and preventable workplace
hazards."

5

Therefore, an employer can be found in violation of

the Safety and Health Act if it does not take10 6steps to avoid a fore-

seeable and preventable workplace hazard.
Moreover, the Safety and Health Act allows states the concur-

rent power to apply their legislative and judicial common law authority with respect to occupational hazards.' 7 Applicable New
Jersey common law for workplace safety is based upon the theory
that an employee assumes those risks ordinarily incident to employment.108 To postulate how a nonsmoking employee could
bring an action under the New Jersey Worker Health and Safety
103 446 F. Supp. 181, 182 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
104 Id. at 183 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 652(5) (1989)).
105 California Stevedore & Ballast Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review
Comm'n, 517 F.2d 986, 988 (9th Cir. 1975) (citation omitted). In CaliforniaStevedore,
a stevedoring company petitioned for review of alleged OSHA violations. Id. at 987.
The court found that the citations issued by an inspector were not arbitrary and were
in accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act. Id. at 989 (citation omitted).
106 See National Realty & Constr. Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review
Comm'n, 489 F.2d 1257, 1267 (D.C. Cir. 1973). The petitioner in National Realty
sought review of a citation for violating the Act's general duty clause. Id. at 1260.
OSHA charged the petitioner with permitting the continuation of a recognized hazard that could cause death or serious bodily injury to an employee. Id. at 1261. Petitioner's violation ultimately caused the death of an employee. Id. at 1261-62. The
court declared that the mere existence of the hazardous conduct in and of itself was
not adequate evidence of a violation. Id. at 1267. The evidence must show, the court
opined, that the employer did not take feasible measures that would have diminished
the likelihood of the occurrence of hazardous conduct. Id. The court held that the
petitioner did not violate the Act because there was insufficient evidence to show that
the employer did not take feasible measures to prevent its construction site hazard.
Id. at 1268.
107 29 U.S.C. § 653(b)(4) (1989). The Act states:
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to supersede or in any manner affect any workmen's compensation law or to enlarge or diminish or
affect in any other manner the common law or statutory rights, duties,
or liabilities of employers and employees under any law with respect to
injuries, diseases, or death of employees arising out of, or in the course
of, employment.
Id.
108 See Shimp v. New Jersey Bell Tel. Co., 145 N.J. Super. 516, 523, 368 A.2d 408,
411 (Ch. Div. 1976) (stating that a telephone company secretary did not assume the
risk of breathing secondhand smoke while on the job because the smoke-filled environment was not a necessary part of the employer's business).
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Act, 1°9 it is necessary to examine the New Jersey common law in
this area.
II.

SMOKING AS A WORKPLACE HAZARD:

NEW JERSEY COMMON LAW

A.

Employer's Duty of Care

Similar to federal and state legislation such as the Safety and
Health Act and the NewJersey Worker Health and Safety Act, New
Jersey common law provides the right to safe and healthy working
conditions. 11 0 As early as 1865, the NewJersey courts recognized a
common law employer duty of care in Harrisonv. Central Railroad
Co. 1 ' In Harrison, the defendant-railroad company, aware of the
unsafe conditions of one of its bridges, allowed a train of cars to
use the unrepaired bridge. 112 Consequently, the bridge collapsed
resulting in the death of the plaintiff's husband, one of the company's brakemen." 3 The court articulated that the employer contracted with its employees to use reasonable care to protect them
from any unnecessary risks and would be liable for all the damages
which result from the employer's breach of this contract.1 4 By
1903, the rule evolved into a duty that required the employer to
supply the employee with a proper and safe workplace, furnish
functional tools and implements the employee needed for work,
inspect and repair machinery with reasonableness and prudence,
as well as hire competent persons. 115 The common law did not
109 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 34:6A-1 to -49 (West 1988 & Supp. 1993).
110 See infra notes 111-31 and accompanying text (examining the New Jersey common law providing for safe and healthy working conditions). The NewJersey Worker
Health and Safety Act states, in part:

Every employer shall furnish a place of employment which shall be reasonably safe and healthful for employees. Every employer shall install,
maintain and use such employee protective devices and safeguards including methods of sanitation and hygiene and where a substantial risk
of physical injury is inherent in the nature of a specific work operation
shall also with respect to such work operation establish and enforce
such work methods, as are reasonably necessary to protect the life,
health and safety of employees, with due regard for the nature of the

work required.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:6A-3 (1988). See supra notes 91-101 and accompanying text (discussing the Federal Occupational Safety and Health Act and its purpose).
111 31 N.J.L. 293, 300 (1865).
112 Id. at 295.
113 Id.
14 Id. at 300.
115 McDonald v. Standard Oil Co., 69 N.J.L. 445, 447-48, 55 A. 289, 290 (1903); cf.
Bums v. Delaware & Ad. Tel. & Tel. Co., 70 N.J.L. 745, 750, 59 A. 220, 222 (1904)
(holding that a cause of action existed for an employer's failure to take precautions

19931

COMMENT

require the employer to adopt the latest machine technology, and
the employer was not liable for an accident as long as the equipment used by the employee was kept in a reasonably safe
6
condition.'
Under a service contract, the employee's assumption of risk is
also taken into consideration." 7 The Harrison court articulated
that it is reasonable to assume that an employee consents to the
usual perils incident to employment."' This principle includes
risks that arise from a co-worker's negligence, as well as those dangers which are obvious to one of ordinary skill and comprehension.'
Under the common law, the employee could assume that
the employer provided a reasonably safe workplace; if the employee is notified of a danger or if that danger was obvious to a
reasonable and prudent person under the circumstances, however,
the employer was not liable. 1 0
As employment law evolved, latent dangers also came within
the employer's duty of care.12 ' For example, mining cases often
fell into this category, such as in the case of Davis v. New Jersey Zinc
Co. 1 22 In Davis, an employee, whose job included mining, crushing, separating, and concentrating minerals, worked in a room permeated by allegedly poisonous manganese dust. 12 3 The employer
toward prevention of employee electrocution from the trolley wires that the employees handled).
116 Fenderson v. Atlantic City R.R., 56 NJ.L. 708, 712, 31 A. 767, 769 (1894).
117 McDonald, 69 N.J.L. at 448, 55 A. at 290; see also Zebrowski v. Warner Sugar Ref.
Co., 83 NJ.L. 558, 566, 83 A. 957, 960 (1912) (concluding that an employer who
failed to warn an employee of the danger of an elevator was not liable because the
danger was an obvious and customary risk).
118 Harrison, 31 N.J.L. at 297.
119 McDonald, 69 N.J.L. at 448, 55 A. at 290.
120 Id. at 449, 55 A. at 290 (citation omitted). In McDona
an employee sued his
employer after a co-worker struck a chisel with a hammer and a piece of iron from the
chisel flew into the servant's eye. Id. at 445-46, 55 A. at 289. Eventually, this injury
rendered him blind in that eye. Id. at 446, 55 A. at 289. The plaintiff presented
testimony that such an incident was an obvious danger to the employee in which the
employer failed to take customary precautions. Id. at 446-47, 55 A. at 289-90. Affirming the lower court's decision, the New Jersey Court of Appeals found the employer not negligent because the employee did not take reasonable steps to protect
himself from a known danger. Id. at 450-51, 55 A. at 291.
121 See, e.g., Clayton v. Ainsworth, 122 NJ.L. 160, 162-63, 4 A.2d 274, 276 (1939)
("[It is the) duty of the master to provide a safe place of employment for his servant
and to provide him with proper tools and equipment, if such be necessary, and to
warn the servant of any latent or unusual dangers that might attend the employment."); Western Union Tel. Co. v. McMullen, 58 N.J.L. 155, 159, 33 A. 384, 385
(1895) (finding Western Union liable for failure to warn an employee of the latent
danger of telephone wires' unusually heavy charge of electricity).
122 116 N.J.L. 103, 182 A. 850 (1936).
123 Id. at 104, 182 A. at 851.
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knew of the danger because of several previous manganese poisoning cases.124 Because the employer gave no warning to the workers, the NewJersey Court of Errors and Appeals affirmed the jury's
finding that the employer was negligent in failing to reasonably
protect the worker from the dangerous dust. 1 25 The court asserted
that the employer was also negligent in failing to eliminate the poi26
sonous dust's presence as much as was- reasonably practicable.
Canonico v. Celanese Corp. of America,1 27 however, involved the
inhalation of a non-toxic dust.12 The Canonicocourt declared that
there was no duty to warn employees of the dangers of occupational disease when the employer does not possess more knowledge of the disease than the employee. 1 29 The exception occurs,
the court stated, when the employer has knowledge and the employee is ignorant. 3 ° Standards of reasonableness may change,
however, in accordance with changes in societal attitudes. 3 '
124 Id. New Jersey Zinc Co. employed consultants for its problems of dust poisoning, further evidencing knowledge of an existing danger. Id.

125

Id.

Id.
11 N.J. Super. 445, 78 A.2d 411 (App. Div. 1951).
128 Id. at 447, 78 A.2d at 412. In Canonico, the plaintiff brought an action to recover
damages arising from the inhalation of a nontoxic dust during the course of employment. Id. The plaintiff alleged that the dust in the room was so thick that workers
could not see through it. Id. at 448, 78 A.2d at 413. The employer provided the
employees with masks, but the employees did not use them because they did not have
time to clean them as frequently as necessary. Id. As a result of dust inhalation, Canonico suffered from pulmonary congestion and a chronic pleuritis, which caused left
diaphragm paralysis. Id. at 449, 78 A.2d at 413.
129 Id. at 454, 78 A.2d at 416. Absent proof that the employer failed to conform to
the standards used by similar businesses, the court asserted, the employer was not
liable. Id. at 455, 78 A.2d at 416 (citation omitted).
130 Id. at 454, 78 A.2d at 416 (citation omitted),
131 See Ricci v. American Airlines, 226 N.J. Super. 377, 383, 544 A.2d 428, 431 (App.
Div. 1988). An airline passenger who smoked brought an action against the airline
after a nonsmoking passenger allegedly assaulted him as a result of the carrier's negligence in seating the nonsmoker in the smoking section next to plaintiff. Id. at 380,
544 A.2d at 429-30. The New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division, found that
seating a nonsmoker in the smoking section created an obvious danger that the airline could reasonably anticipate. Id. at 383, 544 A.2d at 431. The court stated: "The
standards by which the reasonableness of a defendant's behavior are measured are
not inflexible, but are fluid and subject to change according to changes in societal
attitudes." Id. (citation omitted). The court determined that the airline overlooked
society's changing attitude toward smoking. Id. In finding the airline negligent, the
court also noted that it was sufficient that the airline's conduct was a substantial factor
in causing the incident, and it knew or should have known the likelihood of such an
occurrence and accompanying injury. Id. at 384, 544 A.2d at 431. The court concluded that American Airlines had an obligation to protect its passengers from reasonably foreseeable harm. Id. at 386-87, 544 A.2d at 433.
126
127
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Smoking as a Workplace Hazard

Shimp v. New Jersey Bell Telephone Co.13 2 is not only the leading
New Jersey case on smoking, but serves as the landmark nonsmoker protection case in the nation. 3 - In Shimp, a nonsmoking
employee allergic to cigarette smoke brought an action for injunctive relief after being forced to breathe involuntarily the secondhand smoke surrounding her worksite.13 4 The presence of the
smoke, even from a single nearby smoker, caused Shimp to suffer
severe irritation of the throat, nose and eyes, as well as headaches,
nausea, and vomiting. 1 35 Although collective bargaining between
Shimp's employee union and the employer provided for an exhaust fan in her work area, this compromise was ineffective in
preventing exposure to the cigarette smoke.' 36 The court awarded
injunctive relief, forcing the company to implement a smoking ban
throughout the building, with the exception of a designated smoking area.' 37 The court further articulated that because tobacco
smoke was not necessary to carry out NewJersey Bell's business, the
plaintiff could not reasonably assume that smoke was a workplace
138
hazard.
When an employer fails to abide by the common law duty to
145 N.J. Super. 516, 368 A.2d 408 (Ch. Div. 1976).
Paolella, supra note 32, at 597. Absent legislation, the common law right to a
healthy and safe workplace can afford protection for workplace nonsmokers. See id. at
597-615. (discussing Shimp in relation to other states' workplace ETS cases). See generallyJohn D. Blackburn, Legal Aspects of Smoking in the Workplace, 31 LAB. L.J. 564 (1980)
(discussing Shimp and the legal aspects of smoking in the workplace); Fox, supra note
32, at 326-30 (examining Shimp and other common law claims by employees that
workplace smoking violates the employer's common law duty of care); Jana T. Whitgrove, Comment, Warning: California Antismoking Laws May Be Dangerous to Your
Health-An Analysis of Nonsmokers' Rights in the Workplace, 14 PAc. L.J. 1145, 1158-64
(1983) (addressing the common law duty of care by analyzing Shimp and similar
cases).
134 Shimp, 145 N.J. Super. at 520, 521, 368 A.2d at 409, 410. The company allowed
employees to smoke at their desks while working. Id. at 520, 368 A.2d at 409. Shimp's
desk was in a work area with smokers. Id., 368 A.2d at 409-10.
135 Id. at 521, 368 A.2d at 410. The smoke from only one cigarette was enough to
cause Shimp to suffer from a severe allergic reaction. Id.
136 Id. The fan exposed other employees to cold drafts. Id. As a compromise between employees, the fan was not in continuous use, therefore it was ineffective in
preventing Shimp from inhaling secondhand smoke. Id.
137 Id. at 531, 368 A.2d at 416.
138 Id. at 523, 368 A.2d at 411. In Canonico v. Celanese Corp. of America, the non-toxic
by-product produced was a necessary result of the business's operations. Canonico v.
Celanese Corp. of Am., 11 N.J. Super. 445, 447-48, 78 A.2d 411, 412-13 (App. Div.
1951). The product's existence was a known and obvious risk incident to Canonico's
employment in the pulverizing room. Id. at 454-55, 78 A.2d at 416-17. Shimp, on the
other hand, involved a secretary breathing cigarette smoke, which was not a necessary
NewJersey Bell business by-product, but rather a toxic substance detrimental to one's
132
133
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act, the Shimp court stated, an employee can use a court of equity
to enforce his or her rights by commanding the employer to eliminate the existing health hazard. 139 The Shimp court posited that
courts protect employee rights by way of injunction 140 and do not
need legislative implementation to provide for a remedy to protect
4
employee rights.1 1
Acknowledging cigarette smoke's connection with lung cancer, emphysema, and heart disease,142 the chancery division declared the work area unsafe due to the hazard of the toxic byproducts of burning tobacco.143 The court bolstered this conclusion by noting that Congress officially recognized the dangers of
cigarette smoke in 1965.144 Congress set forth a national policy,
the court explicated, not only to warn the public of the dangers of
cigarette smoking,
but also to discourage the public from the habit
1 45
of smoking.

health. Shimp, 145 N.J. Super. at 523, 368 A.2d at 411. The Shimp court stated that
pencils, pens, paper, telephone, and typewriter were the tools of Shimp's trade. Id.
139 Shimp, 145 N.J. Super. at 524, 368 A.2d at 411. Accordingly, the Shimp court
reaffirmed that a court of equity has power over labor matters unless the legislature
withdraws the specific subject matter from its jurisdiction. Id., 368 A.2d at 412.
140 Id., 368 A.2d at 411 (citations omitted); see also Cooper v. Nutley Sun Printing
Co., 36 N.J. 189, 195, 175 A.2d 639, 642 (1961) (noting that absent controlling legislation, the courts are the proper forum for dealing with labor relations disputes) (citations omitted); Johnson v. Christ Hosp., 84 NJ. Super. 541, 544-45, 202 A.2d 874, 876
(Ch. Div. 1964), affd, 45 N.J. 108, 112, 211 A.2d 376, 379 (1965) (proclaiming that
without assertion of federal jurisdiction over certain employees, state courts have jurisdiction over cases involving those employees' rights to bargain collectively) (citations
omitted).
141 Shimp, 145 N.J. Super. at 524-25, 368 A.2d at 412 (citing Cooper, 36 N.J. at 197,
175 A.2d at 643). Specifically, the court stated: "The power which a court of equity
possesses to fashion a remedy is a broad power. The form of relief granted rises from
the needs and rights of the parties demonstrated to the court." Id. at 525, 368 A.2d at
412.
142 Id. at 527, 368 A.2d at 414.
143 Id. at 525-26, 368 A.2d at 413.
144 Id. at 526, 368 A.2d at 413.
145 Id. at 526-27, 358 A.2d at 413. The Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act (Cigarette Act) strengthened Congress's warning on all cigarette packages. 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1331-40 (1989). The purpose of the Cigarette Act is:
[T]o establish a comprehensive Federal program to deal with cigarette
labeling and advertising with respect to any relationship between smoking and health, whereby(1) the public may be adequately informed that cigarette smoking
may be hazardous to health by inclusion of a warning to that effect on
each package of cigarettes; and
(2) commerce and the national economy may be (A) protected to
the maximum extent consistent with this declared policy and (B) not
impeded by diverse, nonuniform, and confusing cigarette labeling
and adverse regulations with respect to any relationship between
smoking and health.

1993]

COMMENT

983

The Shimp court conceded that, in the past, many people considered smoking a hazard that one voluntarily assumed despite
health warnings. 146 The court recognized, however, that various
health reports on smoking, such as the 1972 Surgeon General report, along with medical testimony on the deleterious effects of tobacco smoke, served as overwhelmingly clear and convincing
evidence to allow for a different conclusion.1 4 7 The court determined that smokers' right to risk their own health does not encompass the right to endanger the health of those who have to remain
around them to perform occupational duties. 1 48 The court found
that due to the large number of hypersensitive nonsmokers in the
workplace, an employer could reasonably foresee that the toxic
smoke imposed a negative health impact upon these nonsmokers. 149 This, the court added, imposed a duty to prevent the
dangerous hazard upon the employer.150 Although the Shimp
court declared that New Jersey Bell must forbid smoking in the
work and customer service areas, the court also indicated that the
employer should
provide access to a smoking area for smoker
51
employees.1
15 U.S.C. § 1331 (1989). For an in-depth discussion of the statute and its preemptive
scope, see Thomas C. Bigosinski, Note, 23 SETON HALL L. REv. 1791, 1811-14, 1826-33
(1993).
146 Shimp, 145 NJ. Super. at 527-28, 368 A.2d at 414. The court noted that this was
a general assumption prior to reports evidencing the toxic nature of cigarette smoke.
Id. at 527, 368 A.2d at 414.
147 Id. at 528-30, 368 A.2d at 414-15. The court recognized the affidavit of former
United States Surgeon General, Dr. Luthor Terry, an expert on cardiovascular disease, which divided the effects of secondhand smoke on nonsmokers into three categories: (1) those who are sensitive to cigarette smoke and experience allergic
reactions; (2) those who have chronic diseases, such as cardiovascular disease and
lung disease, whose medical conditions are exacerbated by the smoke; and, (3) those
who find significant amounts of tobacco smoke unpleasant and uncomfortable. Id. at
528, 368 A.2d at 414. The court added that "Dr. Michael Diamond, a specialist in
allergy and immunology, estimat[ed] that 10% of the United States population has an
allergy to tobacco smoke." Id. at 529, 368 A.2d at 415. The court also noted the
opinion of Dr. Donald Bews, a certified specialist in occupational medicine, who asserted that the workplace should be devoid of tobacco smoke, a major source of air
pollution. Id. at 530, 368 A.2d at 415. The court stated that Dr. Bews, a medical
director with Bell Telephone in Canada for 28 years, came to this conclusion after he
observed the harmful effects of tobacco smoke on smokers and nonsmokers alike. Id.
148 Id. at 530-31, 368 A.2d at 415. The court articulated that everyone around a
smoker must rely on the same air supply. Id. at 530, 368 A.2d at 415.
149 Id. at 531, 368 A.2d at 415.
150 Id., 368 A.2d at 415-16.
151 Id., 368 A.2d at 416. The court asserted that employers should make available
an employee lunchroom or lounge for employees who want to smoke on their own
time. Id. The court found that this rule did not impose a hardship upon the defendant. Id. The court noted that the company already had a no-smoking policy in effect
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In a Missouri case, Smith v. Western Electric Co., 15 2 the Missouri
Court of Appeals similarly held that an employer breached its common law duty to provide a safe workplace by failing to eliminate
the hazardous condition created by tobacco smoke. 15 3 The court
found that the nonsmoker employee, exposed to cigarette smoke
at his work station, suffered from a severe adverse reaction to the
smoke.154 The court agreed with the employee that an injunction
would be the appropriate remedy to stop the irreparable harm to
his health. 55
The District of Columbia Circuit, in Gordon v. Raven Systems &
Research, Inc., 56 came to the opposite conclusion when a nonsmoker employee failed to present scientific evidence of the hazardous condition of tobacco smoke to nonsmokers.1 57 The court
compared Gordon with Shimp, noting that the Shimp court took judicial notice of the large quantity of scientific and medical evidence
demonstrating the health risks to all workers exposed to cigarette
smoke. 5 8 The Gordon court determined, however, that the plainat the location of its telephone equipment, the rationale being that the equipment
was sensitive and could be damaged by the tobacco smoke. Id. "Human beings are
also very sensitive and could be damaged by cigarette smoke," the court articulated,
but the often irreparable injury to a lung, heart, or eye could not be replaced as could
telephone equipment. Id. The court added: "A company which has demonstrated
such concern for its mechanical components should have at least as much concern
for its human beings." Id.
152 643 S.W.2d 10 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).
153 Id. at 13 (citation omitted).
154 Id. at 12. The employee's symptoms, the court provided, included: "[S]ore
throat, nausea, dizziness, headache, blackouts, loss of memory, difficulty in concentration, aches and pains in joints, sensitivity to noise and light, cold sweat, gagging, choking sensations, and lightheadedness." Id.
155 Id. at 13. Finding that money damages were the best form of relief for physical
damage, the Smith court opined that money was inadequate redress when an injunction could avoid future permanent injury. Id.
156 462 F.2d 10 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
157 Id. at 15. The plaintiff worked as a member of the defendant-company's insecticide team. Id. at 11. It was company policy to place all team members in the same
work area. Id. Gordon notified the company that she was sensitive to tobacco smoke
and requested not to be located near smoker employees. Id. The company, in an
attempt to accommodate Gordon's request, relocated her worksite. Id. Consequently, Gordon could not sit near her work team as company policy mandated. Id.
The employer eventually moved Gordon near her work team, whose members agreed
not to smoke while she was present. Id. Gordon's team was situated, however, next to
the office of a smoker employee, which resulted in the continuation of Gordon's
symptoms of headache, nausea, and eye tearing. Id. Gordon then returned to her
former location away from her work team. Id. In response, the employer placed
Gordon on probation for insubordinate behavior-not reporting to the assigned
worksite. Id. at 12. When Gordon did not return to her assigned worksite the following day, the company terminated her employment. Id.
158 Id. at 15. See supra notes 143-47 and accompanying text (providing the Shimp
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tiff did not present such evidence but merely claimed that her employer owed her a common law duty to provide a safe and healthy
workplace free of tobacco smoke. 1 59 Lacking compelling scientific
evidence, the Gordon court refused to impose a duty to structure an
employer's workplace in accordance with the sensitivities of a single employee." ° A right to a smoke-free environment, the court
articulated, 6 1is an issue that the courts should leave to the
legislature.'

III.

STATUTORY LAW

New Jersey passed its first smoking laws in 1981, regulating
smoking in passenger elevators, 1 62 health care facilities, doctor's offices, 16 3 and educational institutions. 16 4 It was not until 1985, six
years after the Shimp decision, that New Jersey Governor Thomas
Kean signed a set of new laws that regulated smoking in the workplace, 65 retail food and marketing stores, 1 66 indoor public
places, 1 67 and government buildings.' 6 The underlying policy of
these smoking statutes was to balance the rights of smokers to
smoke and nonsmokers to breathe clean air.' 69 The statute states:
court's judicial notice of evidence demonstrating the harmful nature and effects of
tobacco smoke).
159 Gordon, 462 F.2d at 15. Similar to the plaintiff in Smith, the court noted that the
nonsmoking employee was sensitive to the smoke. See id.
160 Id. Without such a duty, the Gordon court stated, the defendant company did no
wrong to Gordon. Id.
161 Id. at 14 (citation omitted). The court articulated that Gordon did not ask the
court to construe a statute granting protection to a particular class. Id. By declaring
that a common law right to a smoke-free workplace exists for an employee with sensitivities to tobacco smoke, the court opined that Gordon in effect asked the court to
do the legislature's job. Id. The court, however, refused to do so. Id.
162 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 26:3D-1 to -6 (West 1987).
163 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 26:3D-7 to -14 (West 1987).
164 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 26:3D-15 to -22 (West 1987 & Supp. 1993).
165 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 26:3D-23 to -31 (West 1987).
166 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 26:3D-32 to -37 (West 1987).
167 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 26:3D-38 to -45 (West 1987).
168 NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 26:3D-46 to -54 (West 1987). For a historical perspective of
anti-smoking legislation, see Sally A. Buck, Note, Smoking In Public: Nonsmokers' Rights
And The Proposed Iowa Clean Indoor Air Act, 37 DRAKE L. REv. 483, 486-89 (1987-88)
(recognizing that statutes and ordinances restraining the consumption of cigarettes
existed in the 1800's). Legislation to control smoker air pollution, however, was not
created until the end of the nineteenth century. Id. Such anti-smoking legislation
was repealed by 1927 due to a convincing public sentiment that smoking was acceptable and prohibition was not. Id. at 486-87. It was not until the release of the 1964
Surgeon General's Report on smoking that nonsmokers began to assert their rights.
Id. at 487. By the 1970's, anti-smoking statutes returned and modern anti-smoking
legislation began. Id.
169 Smoking Legislation, Public Hearings on Assembly Bill 546 before the New Jersey Assembly
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The Legislature finds and declares that the resolution of the
conflict between the right of the smoker to smoke and the right
of the nonsmoker to breathe clean air involves a determination
of when7 0and where, rather than whether, a smoker may legally
smoke.'
The NewJersey Legislature found that the right to breathe clean air at
work is paramount to the right to smoke at work. 71 The law's purpose is to control workplace smoking, while permitting smoking in
designated areas.' 72 The Legislature declared that tobacco smoke is
Judiciay Committee 4 (Sept. 25, 1984) [hereinafter Assembly Bill 546]; see IMA MANAGEMENT ASS'N, EMPLOYER'S GUIDE TO NEWJERSEY EMPLOYEE RELATIONS LAWS AND REGULATIONS 15-5 (1986). Statement to Assembly Bill No. 546 states:

The purpose of this bill, as well as its companion bills is to protect and
preserve in a reasonable manner the health and comfort of the people
in this State by establishing areas that are free from the toxic and annoying effects of tobacco smoke. As a result of hearings held on smoking, it
is clear that there is overwhelming scientific evidence that tobacco
smoke is detrimental to nonsmokers' health, welfare, and comfort, especially to those who have allergies or cardiovascular or respiratory diseases. The regulation of smoking in certain confined places, i.e.,
determining when and where, rather than whether, a smoker may legally smoke is, therefore, necessary for the public health. This bill is
even more important in our industrial State where tobacco smoke acts
to exacerbate the effects of our existing air quality.
Specifically, this bill requires employers to balance the health and
comfort of nonsmoker employees with the right of employees who desire to smoke by establishing respective areas for each. Several employers have adopted this policy and either prohibit smoking in their
facilities or control it by limiting smoking to certain areas. The provisions of the bill do not mandate private businesses to adopt a particular
policy, but only set broad parameters. This bill would permit further
restrictions not contrary to the bill to be adopted by the employer or to
be negotiated as a term or condition of employment.
A person smoking in violation of this act would be subject to a fine
not to exceed $100.00. Failure to establish nonsmoking areas and to
post such areas after being notified of noncompliance by the Department of Health or local board of health may result in a fine not to
exceed $25.00 for the first offense, not to exceed $100.00 for the second, and not to exceed $200.00 for each additional offense.
Fines shall be collected by the Department of Health or local board
of health. No suit may be brought to enforce this act except by the
Department of Health or local boards of health. The Commissioner of
Health shall report back to a joint committee of the General Assembly
Judiciary, Law, Public Safety and Defense Committee and the Senate
Law, Public Safety and Defense Committee in 2 years as to the effectiveness of this act.
Id.

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:3D-23 (West 1987).
Id. Specifically, the statute states that "the Legislature finds that in those places
of employment affected by this act the right of the nonsmoker to breathe clean air
should supersede the right of the smoker to smoke." Id.
172 Id.
170
171
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not only a nuisance and an annoyance to the majority of nonsmokers,
it is a substantial health hazard to a smaller percentage of nonsmokers. 173 The declaration that a substantial health risk only exists
for a smaller segment of nonsmokers, however, is no longer compatible with the latest findings set forth in such documents as the 1992
EPA report on the health risks of ETS for smokers and nonsmokers
74
alike, which recognized a substantial health hazard to everyone.'
Additionally, the New Jersey law only applies to places of employment with fifty or more employees. 1 75 The law defines "place of employment" as an enclosed building or structure not frequented by the
public. 176 Such places of employment must establish a written smokId.
See EPA REPORT, supra note 3, at 1-1 (announcing that exposure to ETS poses a
serious and substantial health risk to both smokers and nonsmokers).
175 NJ. STAT. ANN. § 26:3D-24(b) (West 1987). Concerning the 50 or more employees requirement, Mr. Robert Rosner, former Group Health Cooperative consultant,
stated the following at the public hearing on smoking legislation:
The only problem I have with the bill as developed is the 50-person
rule.... The small companies which have below 50 people are the types
of companies which stand to be sued, because they would not be protected from being sued by the employees.
173
174

The companies which most need that protection would be exempted. So, I think that the small businesses which stand to lose the
most from a long lawsuit by their employees, in terms of costs and morale issues, need that protection.
[Litigation to a small company could have a very profound effect.
Assembly Bill 546, supra note 169, at 23, 27 (statement of Robert Rosner).
Dr. Elissa Santora, Clinical Chief of Surgical Oncology at St. Barnabas Medical
Center in Livingston, New Jersey, later added: "I think the point brought up about
the 50 employees is very, very important because it is the small businesses that tend to
have less air space, or breathing space-never mind legislation-but just health habits. All persons have these rights." Id. at 29, 31 (statement of Dr. Elissa Santora). Judy
Gilbert, concerned citizen, also spoke out about the 50 employee rule:
This past summer, my daughter was employed by AT&T Information
Systems in an office of 49 people. She happened to have been the only
person who did not smoke. She was ill the entire summer. She had
upper respiratory and throat problems because of the smoke. Everyone
in front of her, behind her, and the supervisor who was instructing her
constantly had a cigarette under her nose. She was even forced to miss
a day or two of work because of illness. She is a college senior and she
was interested in a career with AT&T, so she found it necessary to remain at this position in order to secure her future.
....
The cigarette smoking was constant. There was no lounge she
could go to, to escape from the smoke. There wasn't a room. There
was nowhere she could go, other than to leave the building.
Id. at 109-10 (statement of Judy Gilbert).
176 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:3D-24(b) (West 1987).
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ing policy "to protect the health, welfare and comfort of employees
from the detrimental effects of tobacco smoke." 7 7 The act allows for
a one-year smoking phaseout period and does not prohibit the employer and employee from negotiating a smoking policy as terms of an
17
employment contract. 1
The smoking statutes permit NewJersey or any of the state's political subdivisions or agencies to recommend smoking policy guidelines
79
for employers; these guidelines, however, are not mandatory.
Places of employment that do prohibit smoking or permit it in specific
areas must post the appropriate international symbols."' s If an employer fails to comply with the smoking laws, the State Department of
Health must first notify the employer in writing, stating the alleged
violations and recommendations on how to correct them. 1 ' As an
incentive to employers, the legislation protects those employers who
implement a written workplace smoking policy by eliminating liability
for injury resulting from exposure to tobacco smoke.18 2 Such employee injury claims, however, are allowed if the employer does not
provide the reasonable health and safety requirements3 as set forth
18
under Title 34, Labor and Workmen's Compensation.
With approximately twenty-nine percent of the American adult
population smoking cigarettes, 8 4 added to the plethora of medical
and scientific evidence of the negative effects of passive smoke, new
smoking legislation is necessary.'8 5 As one of the first states to implement such aggressive smoking laws, Vermont recently amended its
NJ. STAT. ANN. § 26:3D-25 (West 1987).
Id.
NJ. STAT. ANN. § 26:3D-26(a) (West 1987).
NJ. STAT. ANN. § 26:3D-27 (West 1987).
181 NJ. STAT. ANN. § 26:3D-28(a)(1) (West 1987). The employer may then request
a meeting with the Department of Health to review the employer's legal obligations.
§ 26:3D-28 (a) (3). If the conference is not successful, only the Commissioner of
Health can enforce the law by bringing an action against the employer in a NewJersey
Superior Court. NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 26:3D-28(b), -29 (West 1987).
182 § 26:3D-29.
183 Id. See supra note 110 and accompanying text for the contents of the New
Jersey Worker Health and Safety Act.
184 NIOSH BULLETIN, supra note 10, at 2.
185 Gasp!, 132 N.J. LJ. 585, 598 (Nov. 9, 1992). The author suggested that the legislature should recognize that tobacco smoke has deleterious effects on the health of
nonsmokers, particularly infants and children. Id. Public costs, such as healthcare
expenses, the author pointed out, are a concern as well. Id. The author argued that
such costs demand reconsideration of the protections given to nonsmokers; it is a
problem to be solved by implementation of more aggressive smoking control laws. Id.
Such laws are needed to safeguard the health of nonsmokers in all public places such
as: malls, casinos, sporting arenas, and the hallways of public buildings. Id. The legislature also needs to take action to educate the public-especially parents-and the
media of the expense and negative health consequences of tobacco smoke. Id.
177
178
179
180
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smoking control laws, which now prohibit "[t] he possession of lighted
tobacco products in any form... in the common areas of all enclosed
indoor places of public access and publicly owned buildings and offices."' 8 6 The Vermont legislature principally relied on two factors:
the 1992 EPA report on secondhand smoke, and the fact that seventynine percent of the adult population of Vermont does not smoke.' 8 7
186 1993 Vermont Laws Public Act 46, H.B. No. 159 (1993) (codified as VT. STAT.
18, § 1742 (1993)). Vermont law defines "a place of public access" as:
[A]ny place of business, commerce, banking, financial service, or other
service-related activity, whether publicly or privately owned and whether
operated for profit or not, to which the general public has access or
which the general public uses, including buildings, offices, means of
transportation, common carrier waiting rooms, arcades, restaurants,
bars and cabarets, retail stores, grocery stores, libraries, theaters, concert halls, auditoriums, areans (sic], barber shops, hair salons, laundromats, shopping malls, museums, art galleries, sports and fitness
facilities, planetariums, historical sites, and common areas of nursing
homes, hospitals, resorts, hotels and motels, including the lobbies, hallways, elevators, restaurants, restrooms, and cafeterias.
Id. (codified as VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1741 (1993)).
By comparison, the New Jersey definition of "indoor public place," which is less
inclusive than Vermont's, reads:
[A] structurally enclosed area generally accessible to the public in theatres, gymnasiums, libraries, museums, concert halls, auditoriums, or
other similar facilities which are neither owned or leased by a governmental entity or qualify as a health care facility or the waiting room of a
person licensed to practice the healing arts. Race track facilities, casinos licensed under the "Casino Control Act,"... facilities used for the
holding of boxing and wrestling exhibitions or performances, football,
baseball, and other sporting event facilities, bowling alleys, dance halls,
ice and roller skating rinks and other establishments providing ambulatory recreation are excluded from this definition.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:3D-39(a) (West 1987).
187 1993 VT. LAws 46 § (1)(a). The law states:
Sec. 1. FINDINGS AND PURPOSE
(a) The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) report # 600/6-90/
006F issued January 7, 1993 classified Environmental Tobacco Smoke
("ETS") as a "group A" carcinogen. ETS (sometimes known as side
smoke, secondhand smoke or passive smoke) is therefore classified with
the most toxic substances known to cause cancer in humans. "Group A"
carcinogens include dioxin, benzene, radon and asbestos.
(b) Numerous scientific studies have shown an increased risk of lung
cancer among non-smokers from exposure to environmental tobacco
smoke in household settings. Exposure of children to environmental
tobacco smoke from parental smoking is a cause of increased respiratory infections, increased risk of asthma, and decreased lung function.
Adults and children with asthma and chronic respiratory conditions
may experience worsening of their condition from exposure to environmental tobacco smoke in both public and private settings.
(c) Seventy-nine percent of adult Vermonters do not smoke.
(d) The purpose of this act is to protect public health by reducing
exposure to environmental tobacco smoke.
ANN. tit.
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The restrictions do not apply, however, to areas designated by the employer as smoking areas."'
Vermont has shown concern for the well-being of its citizens by
purposefully enacting statutes to protect them from the harm of
ETS. 8 9 New Jersey needs to enact more stringent smoking laws to
protect its citizens as well.' 90 The New Jersey smoking laws, without
proper guidelines, merely place a slight burden upon smokers, nonsmokers, and employers alike.1 9 '
IV.

CONSIDERATIONS FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF A WORKPLACE
SMOKING BAN

Because New Jersey workplace smoking guidelines are neither
proposed by the state legislature nor mandatory, employers are al192
lowed to implement the policy that works best for the company.
Under current New Jersey law, employers with less than fifty employees do not have to consider implementation of a smoking policy. 193 This failure to protect nonsmokers, however, opens the
door for potential lawsuits.'
Employees can bring actions under
the common law for injunctive relief,'9 5 for workers' compensation, 96 under the Rehabilitation Act,' 9 7 or under the Safety and
Health Act.'9 ' Additionally, employees can file for unemployment
compensation. 199 The traditional response to ETS complaints was
to segregate the smoker and nonsmoker employees in the work
Id.
188 1993 Vermont Laws Public Act 46, H.B. No. 159 (1993) (to be codified as VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1743 (1993)). "Smoking area" is defined as "an area that nonsmoking employees are not required to visit on a regular basis where smoking is permitted pursuant to a policy established under this subchapter. Up to 30 percent of
employee cafeteria and lounge areas may be designated as a smoking area." VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 18, § 1421 (1) (Supp. 1993).
189 1993 VT. LAws 46 § (1)(a).
190 Gasp!, supra note 185, at 598.
191 See Massengill & Petersen, supra note 83, at 507.
192 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:3D-26(a) (West 1987).
193 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:3D-24(b) (West 1987). In Vermont, for example, a written smoking policy is required of employers with 10 or more employees who work
greater than 15 hours per week. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1423(b) (1993).
194 Research Inst. of Am., supra note 20, at 5.
195 See supra notes 132-61 and accompanying text for cases brought by employees
seeking injunctive relief prohibiting cigarette smoke.
196 See supra notes 36-43 and accompanying text for cases brought by employees
seeking workers' compensation after suffering from ETS exposure.
197 See supra notes 52-57 and accompanying text for cases brought by employees
claiming to be "handicapped" under the Rehabilitation Act.
198 See supra notes 103-06 and accompanying text for cases brought by employees
under OSHA seeking relief from ETS as an occupational hazard.
199 See supra notes 62-84 and accompanying text for cases brought by employees
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area and in the lunch room.2"' The placement of physical barriers
among smoker and nonsmoker work stations, as well as the use of
desktop air cleaners and other air filters, was a similar response.20 '
As shown by the facts of relative case law,20 2 these strategies have a
minimal effect. 20 The employer can segregate the people, but not
the smoke, which eventually travels into nonsmoking areas.20 4
Closed ventilation systems in modem workplace structures save energy, but the systems also recirculate the ETS toxic particles
throughout the workplace.20 5
An employer should not involuntarily expose workers to
ETS. 20 6 Adequate prevention can only take place by elimination of
the cause of the hazardous emission. 20 7 Therefore, complete elimination of tobacco use at the workplace is the best method for protecting employee health. 20 8

Although a complete workplace

smoking ban constructively solves the ETS problem, it can lead to
resentment by smoker employees. 20 9 The NIOSH adopted guidelines to solve this problem by suggesting that management and labor work hand in hand to adopt smoking policies.210 Such policies
who filed for unemployment compensation benefits after quitting their jobs due to
exposure to ETS.
200 BuREAu OF Bus. PRAc., supra note 8, at 22. This type of worker separation can
only reduce, not eliminate, involuntary smoke exposure, especially in a work environment where exposure is prolonged. Id.
201 Id. These barriers only afford a slight reduction in passive smoke because the
tobacco smoke easily disperses and circulates beyond physical boundaries. Id.
202 See Shimp v. New Jersey Bell Tel. Co., 145 N.J. Super 516, 521, 368 A.2d. 408,
410 (Ch. Div. 1976) (stating that the exhaust fan placed in an employee's work area
was an ineffective method of eliminating tobacco smoke).
203 BuRAu OF Bus. PRAc., supra note 8, at 22. Air filtering devices are too small to
filtrate tobacco smoke from the air effectively. Id. As a result, the suspended smoke
particles remain in the air for a long time. Id. The only way to remove such particles
from indoor air is to augment exchanges of clean outdoor air with indoor air. Id.
"'The number of air changes per hour required to maintain acceptable indoor air
quality is much higher when smoking is allowed than when smoking is prohibited.'"
Id. (quotation omitted).
204 Id.
205 Id. Smoking area ventilation should meet the general standard and "have slight
negative pressure to ensure airflow into the area rather than back into the airspace of
the workplace." NIOSH BULLETIN, supra note 10, at 13 (citation omitted).
206 NIOSH BULLETIN, supra note 10, at 12.
207 Id.
208 Id. A smoking ban is also beneficial for the following reasons: it shows concern
for employee health; it may motivate smokers to quit; it can transform worksite smoking norms; it may decrease an employee's daily cigarette consumption; it may aid the
smoker in finding other stress reduction techniques; and it will benefit the 60% of
employees who are occasionally bothered by workplace smoking. BuRAu OF Bus.
PRAc., supra note 8, at 20.
209 BUREAU OF Bus. PRAc., supra note 8, at 21.
210 NIOSH BULLETIN, supra note 10, at 13.
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need to include the following: workplace smoking prohibition accompanied by disincentives for noncompliance; information distribution on the hazards and negative health effects of smoking;
smoking-cessation classes; and incentives to quit smoking.211
An example is Ohaus Corporation, a manufacturer of weights
and balances, located in Florham Park, New Jersey.2 12 Ohaus currently employs a total of 360 people in its offices and adjacent
plant.2 13 It was not until 1992 that Ohaus banned smoking
throughout the building, with the exception of the employee cafeteria.2 14 The nonsmokers, however, must walk through the smoking section of the one-room cafeteria to get to their tables.2 15 Since
implementation of the smoking ban, Ohaus has offered employee
smoking cessation programs for free if the employee successfully
quits smoking within a six-month period.2 1 6 In recognition of potential health hazards and nonsmoker confrontation, Ohaus plans
to ban smoking throughout the entire building in 1994.217 Such
employer action is not necessary under New Jersey law, however,
which allows the designated smoke-filled cafeteria to be shared
with the nonsmoking employees.2 1 8 Recognition should be given
to those employers who, of their own volition, take the necessary
steps toward a total ban.2 1 9
V.

COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

Employers that have a collective bargaining agreement with
their employees must implement a no-smoking policy with caution.2 2 ° Implementation of a policy without bargaining with the
employee union can lead to a claim of unfair labor practice before
211

Id.

212 Interview with Sally A. Moran, Human Resources Supervisor of Ohaus Corpora-

tion, in Florham Park, N.J. (June 28, 1993).
213 Id.
214 OHAus CoRPORATION, OHAus EMPLOYEE HANDBOOK (Apr. 1, 1992).

215 Interview with Sally A. Moran, supra note 212.
216 Id.
217 Id.

218 See NJ. STAT. ANN. § 26:3D-23 (West 1987).
219 See Interview with Sally A. Moran, supra note 212. For example, Public Service
Electric and Gas of New Jersey banned its 13,000 employees from smoking in its 100

workplaces and company vehicles. Smoking in the Workplace, supra note 11, at 4. Headquarters Plaza Hotel, located in Morristown, New Jersey, banned smoking on all but
one of its floors. Id. McDonald's took a first step by declaring that 40 of its fast food
restaurants will soon be smoke-free. Id. Smoking is also banned in the White House.

Id.
220 See Smoking in the Workplace, supra note 11, at 4.
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the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). 1 To avoid unfair
labor practices, the employer must review the existing collective
bargaining agreement to see if it qualifies smoking arrangements
with employees as a contractual right.22 2 If so, the employer must
bargain in good faith for the implementation of a no-smoking policy.113 The policy of the NLRB is to treat a no-smoking policy as a
bargained for "working condition." 2 4 Due to conflicting interests
221 W-I Forest Products Co. & Lumber & Sawmill Workers Local 2841, 304 N.L.R.B.
957, 957 (1991). In Forest Products, the respondent operated a lumber mill where the
production and maintenance employees were represented by a union. Id. Although
the respondent previously permitted smoking in designated areas of the mill, the
company decided to implement a total smoking ban. Id. at 957. The National Labor
Relations Board (Board) found that such a ban was a subject of mandatory bargaining, whether or not the union representative sought implementation, limitation, or
elimination of a workplace smoking ban. Id. at 959. The Board decided, in accordance with United States Supreme Court precedent, that the issue was whether the
matter at hand was "germane to the working environment." Id. (citation omitted).
The Board asserted that although smoking may affect one's health, it is a part of the
smokers' working environment. Id. The closure of issues clause of the bargaining
agreement, the Board determined, did not cover the ban. Id. at 957. The Board
declared, therefore, that the union waived its bargaining right because it did not request bargaining after the respondent notified the union of the ban's future implementation. Id. As a result, the Board affirmed the Administrative Law Judge's
decision to dismiss the complaint. Id. at 962; see also BargainingAbout No-Smoking Policy, LEGALLY SPEAKING (Employers Ass'n of N.J., Verona, N.J.), Nov. 1991 (discussing
the NLRB's decision in W-I Forest) [hereinafter LEGALLY SPEAKING].
The Labor Management Relations Act (Labor Act) created the National Labor
Relations Board. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-87 (1989 & Supp. III 1992); 29 U.S.C. § 153
(1989). The purpose and policy of the Labor Act is:
[T]o promote the full flow of commerce, to prescribe the legitimate
rights of both employees and employers in their relations affecting commerce, to provide orderly and peaceful procedures for preventing the
interference by either with the legitimate rights of the other, to protect
the rights of individual employees in their relations with labor organizations whose activities affect commerce, to define and proscribe practices
on the part of labor and management which affect commerce and are
inimical to the general welfare, and to protect the rights of the public in
connection with labor disputes affecting commerce.
29 U.S.C. § 141(b) (1989). There is no language in the Labor Act that confronts the
issue of workplace smoking. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-87 (1989 & Supp. III 1992).
222 See Smoking in the Workplace, supra note 11, at 4.
223 Krupp, supra note 32, at 523 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (5) (1989)). Section
158(a) (5) states that "[i]t shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer . . . to
refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees, subject to the
provisions of section 159(a) of this title." § 158 (a) (5). The employer cannot unilaterally promulgate a no-smoking policy that is unfair or unreasonable under the circumstances. Stroud, supra note 32, at 358. The policy must be reasonable in relation to
the business, such as designating of a no-smoking area to provide a safe workplace as
prescribed by OSHA. Id. at 357-58 & n.131.
224 Forest Products, 304 N.L.R.B. at 959; see alsoJohns-Mansville Sales v. International
Ass'n of Machinists, Local Lodge 1609, 621 F.2d 756, 759 (5th Cir. 1980) (affirming
an arbitrator's decision that a company's prohibition of smoking violated the union
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between smoker and nonsmoker employees, unions attempt to
protect smokers' rights while still accommodating nonsmokers.2 2 5
Because of current evidence of ETS and the health risk involved,
unions should abandon this position in favor of nonsmoking
employees.2 2 6
Few collective bargaining cases have dealt with smoking issues. 2 2 7 In the Pennsylvania case of ChambersburgArea School District
v. Commonwealth, Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board,2 28 the court
held that a ban on smoking in all public schools was a managerial
decision affecting education policy and not part of a mandatory
bargaining policy. 229 Two years later, in Commonwealth v. Commonwealth, Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board,23 ° the same court held
that the issue of employees smoking at work stations was a
mandatory bargaining policy and not an inherent managerial decision. 2 1' The private employer in Commonwealth implemented a ban
on smoking at employee work stations without prior negotiations
contract, despite the employer's goodwill effort to do what was best for the
employees).
225 Krupp, supra note 32, at 524. See generallyJohn C. Fox & Bernadette M. Davison,
Smoking in the Workplace: AccommodatingDiversity,25 CAL. W. L. REv. 215, 232-34 (198889) (discussing workplace smoking as applied to mandatory collective bargaining).
226 Krupp, supra note 32, at 524.
227 Massengill & Petersen, supra note 83, at 515; see, e.g., Cooper v. Nutley Sun Printing Co., 36 N.J. 189, 192, 201, 175 A.2d 639, 641, 645 (1961) (holding that the superior court had jurisdiction over a dispute where the National Labor Relations Board
declined jurisdiction due to insubstantial effect on commerce); Johnson v. Christ
Hosp., 84 N.J. Super. 541, 568, 202 A.2d 874, 888 (Ch. Div. 1964) (finding hospital
non-professional employees to be privately employed and therefore constitutionally
able to collectively bargain), affid, 45 N.J. 108, 211 A.2d 376 (1965).
228 430 A.2d 740 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1981).
229 Id. at 744. Public interest in providing an effective education, the court asserted, outweighed employee smoking interests. Id.
230 459 A.2d 452 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1983).
231 Id. at 455. The Supreme Court of Connecticut recently came to a similar decision in Local 1186 of Council No. 4, AFSCME, AFL-CIO v. State Board of Labor Relations.
Local 1186 of Council No. 4, AFSCME, AFL-CIO v. State Bd. of Labor Relations, 620
A.2d 766, 771 (Conn. 1993). In Local 1186, the school board instituted a new smoking ban on public school property. Id. at 767. The school employees then requested
negotiations on the new smoking policy, asserting that it was a "unilateral change in
working conditions" and subject to mandatory bargaining. Id. The employees
brought the action upon the school board's refusal to negotiate. Id. Although the
court in Local 1186 did find that the implementation of a no-smoking policy was a
managerial decision, the court held that impact negotiation is required when the
smoking ban has a significant secondary impact on the employees' working conditions. Id. at 769, 771. The court remanded the case to determine the existence of
substantial secondary effects on employment conditions. Id. at 771. The Supreme
Court of Connecticut declared that the requirement of impact bargaining "must be
decided on a case-by-case basis." Id.
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with the bargaining employee representative.2 3 2 The court distinguished Commonwealth from Chambersburgby finding that the ban
entitle the
was a condition of employment and therefore did not
23
unilaterally.
conditions
employer to change working
In contrast, a Wisconsin court concluded, in Rossie v. State Department of Revenue,23 4 that the state's Clean Indoor Air Act 235 was
236
constitutional and not a violation or impairment of contract.
The court rejected the claimant's contention that the Department
of Revenue's smoking ban violated his implied employment contract, which allowed him to smoke at his desk.2 37 The court asserted that a contract is impaired when the challenged legislation
2 38
alters the contract by imposing a loss on the challenging party.
Therefore, the Wisconsin court held that the Department of Revenue's directives were properly instated work rules. 3 9
Absent contractual obligations, the prevailing view remains:
there is no legal right to smoke in the workplace.2 40 There is no
232 Commonwealth, 459 A.2d at 453.
233 See id. at 455-56 n.1. The court noted "that the peculiar characteristics of public
education as an enterprise including the necessity that teaching employees serve as
role models to the students, rendered private sector authorities [i.e., NLRB decisions]
concerning employee smoking bans unserviceable .... ." Id.
234 395 N.W.2d 801 (Wis. Ct. App. 1986).
235 Wis. STAT. § 101.123 (1988).
236 Rossie, 395 N.W.2d at 807-08. Plaintiff, Richard Rossie, was an employee of the
Department of Revenue (DOR) for 18 years as well as a pipe smoker for the same
amount of time. Id. at 804. Rossie brought an action for declaratory judgment and
injunctive relief, asserting that the DOR could not legally stop him from smoking at
his place of employment. Id. Rossie relied on four reasons for his claim: (1) the
DOR did not comply with the statutory rule-making procedure; (2) the DOR overstepped its legislative grant of power; (3) the rule violated the constitutional equal
protection of the laws; and, (4) the rule unconstitutionally impaired plaintiff's right
to contract. Id.
237 Id. at 807-08. The Wisconsin Appellate Court quoted the Wisconsin Department of Revenue Work Rules, which reads: "All employees of the Department are
prohibited from committing any of the following acts: .... 20. smoking in an area of
either a State or Department of Revenue owned or controlled facility which is not
designated as a smoking area." Id. at 804 (quotation omitted).
238 Id. at 808 (citing Burke v. E.L.C. Investors, Inc., 329 N.W.2d 259, 262 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1982)). The Department of Revenue, authorized by statute to designate smoking
areas, chose not to designate the claimant's work station as such an area. Id.
239 Id.
240 Research Inst. of Am., supra note 20, at 5. For more information on the constitutional rights of smokers and nonsmokers, see Carl D. Mayhew, Comment, Smoking
In Public: This Air Is My Air, This Air Is Your Air, 1984 S. ILI. U. L.J. 665, 670-72. One
commentator suggested that two reasons cause the failure of nonsmokers' constitutional arguments. Id. at 670-71. The first is that state action is necessary to support a
constitutional violation. Id. at 670. State action is missing when nonsmokers seek
relief from a state government's failure to restrict or ban smoking. Id. at 670-71. The
second reason is the United States Supreme Court's intention to only afford constitu-
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right to breathe clean air, either, as held in Federal Employees for
Nonsmokers' Rights v. United States.24 1 The court in FederalEmployees
dismissed the nonsmokers' First and Fifth Amendment claims, stating that to read the Constitution as granting the right to breathe
air free of tobacco smoke would broaden constitutional rights "to
limits heretofore unheard of."242 Therefore, NewJersey employees
are in the hands of their legislature, whose current workplace
smoking laws inadequately provide mandatory guidelines to protect ETS exposure. 241
VI.

CONCLUSION

The changing attitudes toward smoking necessitate a change
in the current laws as well. Vermont's tightening smoking laws set
an example for other states and serve as the first step toward
stricter workplace smoking restrictions.24 4 Vermont should therefore be commended for its legislative action. As they stand, New
Jersey smoking laws ignore not only an eight-year span of medical
and scientific studies on ETS, but also a growing concern for public
health. The smoking laws add heat to the ongoing battle for clean
air, opening the door to possible employee lawsuits.
The correct way to end such a battle is to institute a state-wide
mandatory ban of smoking at the worksite. As stated by the National Alliance of Business: "It's just a matter of time before smoktional protection to those rights "explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution." Id. at 671 (quoting San Antonio Independent Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
1, 33-34 (1973) (citations omitted)). Furthermore, the First, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendment claims by nonsmokers are based upon penumbral claims found
implausible by the courts. Id. See generally Fox, supra note 32, at 314-30 (addressing

employees' lack ofjudicially protected rights regarding workplace smoking).
241 446 F. Supp. 181, 184-85 (D.D.C. 1978), affd, 598 F.2d 310 (D.C. Cir.) (mem.),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 926 (1979).
242 Id. at 185 (quoting Gasper v. Louisiana Stadium & Exposition Dist., 418 F. Supp.
716, 722 (E.D. La. 1976)). Plaintiffs claimed their First Amendment right to petition
the government was impaired by the government's failure to eliminate smoke from
government buildings. Id. at 184. The district court did not find evidence of state
action and therefore rejected this argument. Id. Plaintiffs asserted that "the defendants have discriminated against them and denied them their life, liberty, and property

without due process of law in violation of the fifth amendment." Id. (footnote omitted). The court decided that although the plaintiffs' concerns deserved attention in
another forum, such claims should not be heightened to a constitutional status. Id.
(citation omitted).
243 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:3D-25 (West 1987) (requiring the employer to provide a
designated nonsmoking area); § 26:3D-26(a) (West 1987) (enabling the state to sug-

gest non-mandatory guidelines).
244 See supra notes 186-89 and accompanying text for a discussion of Vermont's
workplace smoking regulations.
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ing is completely banned in the workplace. It will happen in 10
years, maybe less."245 Why not be the first state to take this step?
Along with such a ban, the New Jersey legislature needs to
amend its workplace smoking laws to require mandatory ventilation guidelines for designated smoking areas such as cafeterias or
employee lounges. Despite the negative findings on closed ventilation systems which allow recirculation of toxic particles throughout
the workplace, New Jersey still permits the traditional segregation
of employees approach for nonsmoker comfort.2 46 This approach
does not provide clean outdoor air for the nonsmoking, segregated
employees.
A further amendment should redefine "place of employment"
as in the 1993 Vermont Law, which sets the applicable number of
employees at ten.247 Ideally there should be no limit to the
number of employees an employer must legally protect.24 It is un-

fair that New Jersey nonsmoker employees who work at places of
employment with forty-nine persons or less should have to suffer
from ETS exposure. A sixty-two percent chance of nonsmoker exposure to ETS in the workplace 249 combined with the classification
of ETS as a Group A carcinogen 250 should be enough to encourage
New Jersey and every state legislature to take another look at the
effectiveness, or often ineffectiveness, of its workplace smoking
laws.
Rebecca R. Smith

245 The Hope Heart Inst., supra note 7, at 6 (quotation omitted).
246 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:3D-23, -25 (West 1987).
247 See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1423(b) (1993).
248 In furtherance of this proposition, advocates of the New Jersey employer smoking laws opposed the 50 employee limit even before the laws' enactment. Assembly Bill

546, supra note 169, at 23, 27, 29, 31, 109-10. See supra note 175 (outlining these
advocates' statements).
249 NIOSH BULLETIN, supra note 10, at 4.
250 EPA REPORT, supra note 3, at 1-3.

